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 1 
Summary 
Financial services sector is fundamental to economic growth and 
development in all advanced economies. Financial services such as banking, 
savings and investment, insurance, and debt and equity financing constitute 
a nation’s economic engine by fulfilling three core functions in the 
economy. Firstly, these services provide financial intermediation functions 
between savers/investors that are looking for security and growth and 
consumers/businesses who are looking for access to credit and capital. This 
intermediation is vital for allocating capital to the most profitable 
investments, providing a mechanism for saving, raising productivity, and 
consequently, increasing competitiveness of the nation in the global 
economy. Secondly, in addition to pooling investment risks, financial 
services sector provides a mechanism to manage other risks effectively and 
efficiently by way of insurance and increasingly sophisticated derivatives. 
These tools help private citizens and businesses cope with diverse global 
risks and uncertainties. Finally, financial services sector provides the 
practical mechanisms for money to be managed, transferred and received 
quickly and reliably. This is an essential requirement for commercial 
activities to take place and for participation in international trade and 
investment.
1
 
 
Therefore, the financial services sector is specific and can easily be 
distinguished from other sectors. A serious downturn encountered in this 
specific sector might have disastrous impacts on the real economy of a 
nation. The current economic crisis in the United States and Europe, marked 
by the ongoing weaknesses of major banks and the resulting credit and 
capital crunch, highlights the critical importance of the financial services 
sector in national and global economies. 
 
Considering the importance of this sector, it is very hard for States to be 
unresponsive to the calls for assistance from ailing financial institutions. In 
such a situation, the States ask for a well-targeted and organized public 
measures in order to safeguard financial stability and restore economic 
viability. The State aid measures are perceived as part of the solution and 
thus, they are generally implemented to rescue failing firms in the financial 
services sector. However, Member States in the EU should follow certain 
State aid rules while intervening to this specific sector. Unfortunately, the 
specific nature of this sector is not recognized in the EU until the recent 
banking crisis. Member States are required to follow the same State aid 
rules as in other sectors. To realize this fact, the Commission had to wait 
until the end of 2008 when the financial crisis spilled into the real economy. 
Later then, the Commission adopted some flexible measures for this sector 
but their sufficiency is also highly doubtful.  
                                                
1 HM Treaury, (March 2005), ”The UK financial services sector: Rising to the challenges 
and oportunities of globalisation” Crown Copyright, pp.1-3, available at www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk  
 2 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview of the State aid rules 
applied in financial services sector. In the first part, two common types of 
State aid measures granted in the financial services sector, rescue and 
restructuring aid and State guarantees, are discussed in detail. After a review 
of applicable rules in the form of guidelines and notice for these two forms 
of aid measures, implications of the recent financial crisis are discussed in 
the final chapter.  
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Abbreviations 
Banking Communication Commission Communication on the 
application of State aid rules to measures 
taken in relation to financial institutions in the 
context of the current global financial crisis 
 
CFI     Court of First Instance 
 
Commission Notice or Commission Notice on the application of  
The Notice  Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State 
aid in the form of guarantees 
  
EC     European Community  
 
ECJ    European Court of Justice 
 
ECOFIN   Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
 
ECR    European Court Reports 
 
ELA    Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
 
EU    European Union 
 
EUR    Euro 
 
European Courts Court of First Instance and European Court of 
Justice 
 
FRF    French Franc 
 
R&R Guidelines or  Community Guidelines on State Aid for The  
Guideline(s)  rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty 
  
MEIP  Market Economy Investor Test 
 
OJ    Official Journal 
 
R&R    Rescue and Restructuring 
 
SAAP  State Aid Action Plan 
 
SME  Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
Credit institutions play a crucial role in the economy of a State because 
these institutions provide funding to other firms and sectors. Therefore, 
ailing of these institutions or distress in the financial services sector might 
affect the economy in general and create a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a State. In such cases, public authorities provide funding to 
these institutions experiencing difficulties. Thus, State aid rules constitute 
an important part of policy considerations of the Member States in the EU. 
Member States are generally stuck while searching for a balance. On the one 
side, they attempt to maintain an efficient and healthy financial system. On 
the other side, they don’t want to infringe Treaty rules on State aid.  
 
This thesis aims at examining the State aid rules in financial services sector 
and providing guidance as much as possible. For that purpose, following a 
short overview of the State aid provisions by reference to financial services 
sector, types of aid granted commonly in this specific sector and rules 
attached to these aid measures will be discussed. In order to show how the 
Commission applies these rules in practice, chapters will be supported by 
corresponding Commission decisions and case analyses.  
 
The last chapter is allocated to the implications of recent financial crisis. 
The aim of last chapter is to discuss how the Commission’s response 
differed depending on the time and how harsh the crisis is. The Commission 
adopted several new measures during this period to mitigate the effects of 
crisis on the real economy. The Commission had to consider two policy 
options: flexibility or consistency. While the Commission argues that the 
measures adopted during the time of crisis are flexible enough, the Member 
States and some authors argue that the measures are nothing more than a 
simple collection of old and established principles. The novelty of these 
measures compared to old measures will be discussed in detail.  
 
1.2 Method and Material 
In order to examine the State aid rules in the financial services sector, I will 
start presenting the legal framework for State aid rules in general as 
mentioned in Article 87(1) EC. Conditions attached to this provision will be 
analysed one-by-one. At some certain points law and economics approach 
will be used to give the underlying economic rationale of some measures. I 
will also briefly discuss the derogations of State aid rules as laid down in 
Article 87(2) and (3) EC. I will be focusing on Article 87(3)(b) and (c) EC 
which are the most valid provisions for derogations within the context of 
financial services sector.  
 5 
Following that analysis, I will introduce common types of State aid granted 
in the financial services sector; rescue and restructuring aid and State 
guarantees. The relevant rules mentioned in the respective Commission’s 
Guidelines and Notice adopted on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC will be 
presented. Rules will be explained by reference to relevant case law of the 
European Courts and the Commission. Moreover, after each measure, the 
chapter will be complemented by the relevant Commission decisions.  
 
To illustrate the implications of the recent banking crisis, I will provide an 
analysis of the Commission’s response in time. I will describe the new 
measures (two Commission Communications) adopted on the basis of 
Article 87(3)(b) EC by the Commission during the time of crisis. These 
chapters will also be complemented by the relevant Commission decisions.  
 
I will be also using a comparative approach while comparing a new version 
of a legislation with the older version or while comparing the measures 
adopted by the Commission on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC and Article 
87(3)(b) EC.   
 
The thesis is a compilation of numerous legal materials including primary 
and secondary legislation and case law of the Europan Courts and the 
Commission. I have also relied on the literuature and articles on the State 
aid, financial services sector and banking crisis.   
 
1.3 Delimitation 
The thesis starts with an overview of the EU State aid rules with relevance 
to the financial services sector. The aim is not to discuss these rules in detail 
or to provide the problems encountered in their application. For more 
information in that regard, references provided in the text should be 
checked.  
 
There are several derogations for exempting State aid rules as mentioned in 
Article 87(2) and (3) EC. However, throughout the thesis, the focus will be 
on two provisions; Article 87(3)(b) and (c).  
 
Moreover, some services provided by credit institutions might be considered 
as services of general economic interest. The thesis does not contain a 
detailed analysis of these services and certain doubts in that regard. Also, in 
the case of services of general economic interest, Article 86(2) EC, in 
principle, might be relied upon to derogate from the State aid rule. However, 
this thesis does not discuss the applicability of this derogation.  
 
Article 88 EC and Procedural Regulation
2
 establishes the procedural rules 
applicable in State aid cases. Article 88 EC mentions two main procedural 
                                                
2
 Council Regulation 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 
of the Treaty [1999] O.J.L83/1 
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rules namely ”notification obligation” and ”stand-still obligation”. In 
addition, Procedural Regulation differentiates the types of aid and lists the 
detailed procedures to be used in existing aid, notified aid, unlawful aid, and 
misuse of aid in the relevant chapters.
3
 However, these procedural rules are 
outside the scope of this thesis. The reader is assumed to be aware of the 
basic procedural rules of State aid. 
 
The thesis focuses on two common types of aid measures granted in the 
financial services sector; R&R aid and State guarantees. There are also some 
other types of State aids granted in the financial services sector such as aids 
provided in the form of equity transfers, exclusive rights and reservation of 
banking activities, fiscal benefits and preferential taxation of credit 
institutions, and aid provided in the context of liquidation, transfer of assets 
and privatization. These relatively rare types of measures are outside scope 
of this thesis. 
 
The Commission Guidelines, Notice and Communications analyzed set out 
particular rules for specific types of companies such as the ones for SMEs. 
These rules are outside the scope of this thesis. Furthermore, these 
legislative documents refer to the complex financial calculations e.g. 
calculation of financial remuneration or own contribution. These specific 
methods are also outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
                                                
3
 See chapters II, III, IV, and V in Regulation 659/99 for procedures regarding the notified 
aid, unlawful aid, misuse of aid, and existing aid schemes respectively. 
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2 State Aid Rules in the 
Financial Services Sector 
Government intervention in financial services sector and State protection of 
national banks are one of the most problematical issues discussed in 
economic policy. While some views these measures as highly protectionist 
against the underlying principles of the European Union, others motivated 
with the implications of recent global financial crises argue that these 
interventionist policies might be part of the solution. Considering the 
peculiarities of the financial services sector, importance of that sector for the 
economy of the nation in general and the probability of having systemic 
crisis emanating from the financial difficulty of large lending institutions, it 
is very difficult for any government to resist calls for assistance from those 
institutions. Although protecting less competitive credit institutions
4
 should 
result in distortion of competition theoretically, there might be some 
situations where market does not function properly or when the failures of 
such institutions would have more damaging effects on the economy.
5
 In 
such a case, a carefully designed and well targeted State aid can support 
business development and even make the financial markets more efficient 
by eliminating certain obstacles that market forces are unable to tackle on 
their own. 
 
The EC Treaty aims to establish an internal market for the provision of 
financial services by credit institutions by adopting harmonization measures. 
In that regard, various EC Banking Directives
6
 have been adopted and the 
European Monetary Union has been established. The liberalisation of the 
EU financial services sector is ensured by the transposition of these banking 
                                                
4 Credit institution means: “(a) an undertaking whose business is to receive deposits or 
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account; or (b) an 
electronic money institution within the meaning of Directive 2000/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit and 
prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions”. See Article 1 of 
Directive 2000/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 
amending Directive 2000/12/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions, OJ L275 of 27 October 2000, p. 37. For simplicity credit institutions can 
be assumed to mean banks. 
5
 Nicolaides, P. & Kekelekis, M. (2004) An Assessment of EC State Aid Policy on Rescue 
and Restructuring of Companies in Difficulty, European Competition Law Review, 2004, 
25(9) pp.578-583 
6 These Directives such as First Banking Directive (77/780/EEC), Second Banking 
Directive (89/646/EEC), the Own Funds Directive (89/299/EEC), the Solvency Ratio 
Directive (89/647/EEC), the Large Exposure Directive (92/121/EEC) and the Consolidated 
Supervision Directive (92/30/EEC) are consolidated into a single Directive: The European 
Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC (OJ L126/2000) as amended by the 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/28/EC, the Banking Consolidation 
Directive, OJ L257/2000. These Directives are outside the scope of this paper.  
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Directives and the subsequent coordination of the national legislations.
7
 
Besides removal of regulatory obstacles to cross-border lending activities in 
the common market, these Banking Directives set very high burdens on the 
credit institutions. Now, they have to abide by strict banking law 
requirements and increase their competitiveness to be able to survive in a 
broader market. The need for public financing was the inevitable 
consequence for many credit institutions.  
 
However, neither the EC Treaty nor the Banking Directives contains any 
specific provisions or exemptions for the financial services sector. 
Therefore, financial services fall within the scope of the Treaty provisions 
on competition law including State aid provisions. Although this is quite 
clear from the Treaty, it took many years for the European judicature to 
recognize this principle. Credit institutions had argued that they pursued 
services of general economic interest and as a result Treaty rules on 
competition should not, or only restrictively, apply to them. While their 
arguments were partly true
8
, the application of competition rules to the 
financial services sector was confirmed by the European Court of Justice in 
its judgment Zucher v. Bayerische Vereinsbank
9
 in 1981. Accordingly while 
the national jurisdictions can impose specific obligations and requirements 
on credit institutions in order to attain public objectives, credit institutions 
are not “per se entrusted with services of general economic interest” and as 
such are not exempt from the Treaty provisions on competition law. Having 
this background, the Commission started to apply State aid rules to credit 
institutions intensively only in the early 1990s.  
 
This chapter is designed to elaborate on the issue of application of State aid 
rules in the financial services sector. Following a short overview of the State 
aid rules in this specific sector, types of aid granted commonly in this sector 
will be discussed. After each type of aid, relevant case laws of the 
Commission will be provided for exemplification purposes.  
 
2.1 Overview of State aid provisions 
Article 87(1) EC forbids any “aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods … in so far as it affects trade between Member States” as being 
                                                
7 Rossi, P. & Sansonetti, V. (October 2007) Survey of State Aid in the Lending Sector: A 
Comprehensive Review of Main State Aid Cases, Working Paper Series, pp.1353-1394 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962050 
8
 Some credit institutions fulfill specific tasks that might be considered as services of 
general economic interest such as (a) promotion of small and medium sized enterprises, (b) 
granting or guaranteeing of export credits, (c) financing of infrastructure projects, (d) 
municipal financing, (e) social housing loans, and (f) fundraising of a Member State and its 
municipalities. See Report of the European Commission to the Council of Ministers: 
Services of general economic interest in the banking sector, adopted by the Commission on 
17.06.1998 and presented to the ECOFIN Council on 23.11.1998. 
9
 Case 172/80 Zucher v. Bayerische Vereinsbank [1981] ECR I-2021 
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incompatible with the common market. Unfortunately, Article 87(1) EC 
does not define State aid. However, the wording of the article – “…aid 
granted… in any form whatsoever…” - suggests a broad interpretation.
10
 
Lack of guidance in the Treaty as to what constitutes a State aid may be 
intentional because if Member States knew the exact scope of the notion of 
aid they could easily devise measures which would not satisfy all the 
requirements of this notion.
11
 Furthermore, a definition might limit the 
scope of the relevant articles if other forms of illegal aid will be introduced 
in the future. Conversely, lack of a definition lets the European Courts to 
interpret the notion in a broad and flexible way. The Commission, on the 
other hand, has provided an illustrative- but not exhaustive
12
- list of the 
types of aids.
13
 Accordingly, direct subsidies, tax exemptions
14
, preferential 
interest rates, favourable loan terms and exemptions from some monetary 
charges are the major types of State aids. The ECJ, while defining the 
concept of aid, does not make a distinction between measures having the 
positive benefits to the undertaking such as direct subsidies and measures 
decreasing the charges an undertaking would normally bear under normal 
market conditions
15
 such as tax exemptions, a reduction in social security 
contributions
16
, or applying preferential rate for the supply of goods or 
services
17
. According to the ECJ, these two measures have the same effect 
and both should be included in the concept of aid. Therefore, the crucial 
element while defining aid is the substance but not the form or the 
rationale.
18
 Before reviewing the common types of State aid measures in the 
financial sector, the conditions of State aid will be examined in more detail 
below.  
 
2.1.1 Through Member State or State 
Resources 
To be considered as a transfer of State resources within the meaning of 
Article 87(1) of the Treaty, the aid must be granted either directly by the 
State including national regional or local authorities or public credit 
                                                
10
 Craig, P. & de Burca G., EU Law: Text, cases and materials, Oxford University Press, 
2008, p.1087 
11
 Schina, D., State Aids under the EEC Treaty Articles 92 to 94, ESC Publishing Limited, 
Oxford, 1987, p.13 
12
 For example, the list did not include subsidies or tax exemptions, which have been later 
found to constitute State aid. 
13
 Craig, P. & de Burca G., p.1087 
14 Case C-387/92 Banco de Credito Industrial SA (Banco Exterior de Espana SA) v 
Ayuntamiento de Valencia [1994] E.C.R. I-877 
15
 Ibid. para.13 
16
 Case C-75/97 Belgium v Commission [1999] E.C.R. I-3671 
17 Case C-387/92 Banco de Credito, fn.14; Case C-39/94 Syndicat Francaise de l’Express 
International (SFEI) v La Poste [1996] E.C.R. I-3547, paras.58-60 
18
 Case C-310/85 Deufil GmbH & Co KG v Commission [1987] E.C.R. 901, para.8; Case C-
480/98 Spain v Commission [2000] E.C.R. I-8717, para.16. Actually there are some 
exceptional cases where the ECJ considered the purpose of the measure. For instance, see 
Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Fima Sloman 8eptun Schiffahrt AG v Seebetriebbsrat 
Bodo Ziesemer der Sloman 8eptun Schiffahrts AG [1993] ECR I-887 para.22 
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institutions or indirectly by public or private bodies in a manner imputable 
to the State.
19
 In the financial services sector, transfer of State resources may 
take many different forms. For instance, interest subsidies, reduced interest 
or interest free loans, direct subsidies, capital injections
20
, grants, 
preferential terms, tax concessions
21
, overdraft facilities, State guarantees
22
, 
asset reevaluations and over compensation of public credit institutions 
entrusted with services of general economic interest
23
 are the main 
occasions where the transfer of State resources may occur. More details will 
be provided in the case law analysis parts below.  
 
Central banks have a crucial role in the financial sector since most of the aid 
in this sector is granted through these institutions.
24
 Then, the critical 
question is whether these institutions can be treated as State authorities 
within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty. Traditionally, central banks 
have been treated as State authorities when they act on behalf of the 
Government. Therefore, in such a case State aid provisions would be 
applicable because any funding provided by them might constitute a grant of 
State resources imputable to the State. However, when the central bank is 
acting independently of the Member State in the fulfillment of specific 
independent central bank tasks, the central bank could not be treated as State 
authorities within the meaning of State aid provisions of the Treaty.
25
 Any 
funding granted in that case would fail to satisfy the first criterion of the 
State aid rules; through Member State or State resources.  
 
2.1.2 Economic Advantage 
There is no doubt that the State can participate actively in the commercial 
market by using State resources. However, such participation cannot be 
automatically classified as aid.
26
 According to Article 295 of the EC Treaty, 
State owned or controlled enterprises and private enterprises must be treated 
in the same way. In order to distinguish between State investment and State 
                                                
19 Joined Cases T-228/99 & T-233/89 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land 
8ordrhein-Westfalen v Commission [2003] ECR II-345, para.179 
20
 Commission Decision 2000/392/EC of 8 July 1999 on a measure implemented by the 
Federal Republic of Germany for Westdeutsche Landesbank-Girozentrale (WestLB) [2000] 
OJ L150 p.1 
21
 Commission Decision 1999/288/EC of 29 July 1999 giving conditional approval to the 
aid granted by Italy to Banca di 8apoli [1999] OJ L116 p.36 
22
 Commission Decision 2008/263/EC of 27 June 2007 on State aid implemented by Austria 
for BAWAG-PSK [2008] OJ L83 p.7 
23
 Commission Decision 2000/480/EC of 8 July 1999 on aid granted by France to Credit 
Agricole group in connection with the collecting and keeping of notaries’ deposits in rural 
municipalities, OJ L193 p.79 
24 For instance, Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) is one of the most fundamental 
central bank tasks. By providing ELA to the credit institutions, a central bank aims to 
prevent temporarily illiquid, but solvent, credit institutions from becoming insolvent.  
25
 Commission Decision in Case NN/70/2007 (ex. CP 269/07) of 5 December 2007, 
Uniterd Kingdom, Rescue aid to 8orthern Rock, C(2007) 6127final para.38. 
26
 Hancher, L., Ottevanger, T. & Slot, P. J., (2006), “EC State Aids: Ch 3.6 State 
Participation and the Market Economy Investor Test”, Sweet & Maxwell. 
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aid covered by Article 87 EC and to ensure the principle of neutrality with 
regard to the system of property ownership and the principle of equal 
treatment between public and private undertakings, the Commission 
developed the so called market economy investor test.
27
 The European 
Courts have also adopted this test.
28
  
 
Although this basic principle is originally prepared for public undertakings 
in manufacturing sector
29
, it has been applied in all other sectors including 
financial services in the same way. For instance, in its famous 1998 Credit 
Lyonnais decision, the Commission stated that: 
“CDR’s operations with regard to its subsidiaries are deemed not to include 
any aid component only if they conform with the market economy investor 
principle.”
30
 
 
According to the market economy investor test, in order to determine 
whether the provision of public funds to an enterprise constitutes State aid, 
one must check whether the terms and conditions on which those funds are 
provided confer an economic advantage on that enterprise that is not 
possible to obtain under normal market economy conditions
31
 considering 
the information available and any foreseeable developments at the date the 
contributions were made.
32
 The test therefore involves asking whether a 
private investor would subscribe to the State’s conduct in comparable 
circumstances.  
 
It is crucial to note that the market economy investor test is used both to 
identify and to quantify aid.
33
 This principle is also applicable to public 
undertakings, irrespective of whether they are profit or loss making 
entities.
34
 Even in cases where a public shareholder contributed in the 
capital of an undertaking to meet the solvency requirements, the return that 
the public shareholder obtained should be acceptable to a private investor 
                                                
27
 In the state aid literature, this test is also referred to as the market investor test, the 
private investor test, the informed investor test, the informed private investor test, the 
prudent private investor test or the commercial investor test. 
28 See Case C-40/85Belgium v Commission (Boch), [1986] ECR I-2321; Case C-305/89 
Italy v Commission (Alfa Romeo), [1991] ECR I-1603; Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission 
(Lanerossi), [1991] ECR I-1433 
29
 Commission communication to the Member States – Application of Articles 92 and 93 of 
the EEC Treaty and of Article 5 of Commission Directive 1980/723/EEC to public 
undertakings in the manufacturing sector, OJ 1980/C 307/03. 
30
 Commission Decision 98/490 of May 20, 1998 concerning aid granted by France to the 
Credit Lyonnais group [1998] OJ L221/41.   
31 Case C-42/93 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4175, par 13. 
32
 Case C-482/99 French Republic v Commission (Stardust Marine) [2002] ECR I-4397, 
par 70; Case C-261/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-4437, par 8; Case T-16/96 
Cityflyer Express v Commission [1998] ECR II-757, par 76. See also Commission 
Communication to the Member States of 13 November 1993: Application of Articles 92 
and 93 of the EEC Treaty and of Article 5 of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC on public 
undertakings in the manufacturing sector, par 4. 
33
 Harden Ian, (1993), “State Aid: Community Law and Policy”, Bundesanzeiger, Koln, p 
10. 
34
 Commission Decision 2006/737 of October 20, 2004 on aid from Germany for 
Westdeutsche Landesbank – Girozentrale (WestLB) [2006] OJ L307/22 
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operating under normal market economy conditions.
35
 Otherwise, the capital 
injection would be considered to constitute State aid. However, this test is 
not relevant where the State is acting, not as a market participant, but in the 
exercise of its sovereign or public functions, for instance in the adoption of 
fiscal legislation or social policy. By definition, there can be no normal 
market comparator in such cases; therefore the focus is rather on whether 
the measure is selective
36
 which represents the next criterion under Article 
87 EC.  
 
In recent years, the European Courts and the Commission have extended the 
rationale of market investor test and created various iterations of this test to 
cover all types of State measures including government capital injections 
and the grant of State guarantees for obligations of enterprises, where 
reference is made to a private investor, sales of government assets and 
privatizations, where reference is made to a private vendor, loans granted by 
the State and waivers of debt by the State where reference is made to a 
private creditor.
37
 All these tests include a comparison of acts of State with a 
reference market player, either with an investor, vendor or creditor, 
operating under normal market economy conditions. 
 
2.1.3 Selectivity 
Selectivity criterion is integrated basically for defining the fine line between 
general measures of economic policy of States and the State aid while 
applying the non-discrimination principle in the Community. General 
measures of economic policy are in the sovereignty of States. Therefore, the 
rules on State aid cannot be applied for such measures based on the 
condition that they are applied equally to every party irrespective of origin. 
Thus, if a State authority decides to grant public funding to a particular firm 
to the disadvantage of its competitors and if it is not granted to all entities 
without distinction, selectivity condition of Article 87(1) EC would be 
fulfilled.  
 
It follows that although certain measures of tax or social policy could give a 
competitive edge to undertakings established in a given Member State, they 
do not fall within the State aid rules.
38
 For instance, a general interest rate 
reduction cannot be classified as State aid although this measure increases 
the industrial sales up to a certain extent.
39
 In order to be on the safe side 
                                                
35 Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale and Land 
8ordrhein-Westfalen v Commission [2003] ECR II-435 paras. 241 and 313-315 
36
 Biondi, A., Eeckhout, P., & Flynn, J., (2004), “The Law of State Aid in the European 
Union”, Oxford University Press, p 346 
37 For a more detailed discussion on different variants of market economy investor 
principle, see Rydelski Michael Sanchez, (2006), “The EC State Aid Regime: Distortive 
Effects of State Aid on Competition and Trade”, Cameron May, Ch.6 
38
 Steiner, J., Woods, L., & Twigg-Flesner, C., Textbook on EC Law, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, p.286 
39
 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline Gmbh and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke 
GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion fur Karnten [2001] E.C.R. I-8365, para.35 
 13 
with respect to State aid rules, Member States or central banks could adopt 
general measures open to all actors in the market (e.g. a general lending 
opportunity offered to the whole market) instead of granting selective 
advantages to individual banks.
40
 
 
2.1.4 Distortive Effects on Competition and 
Trade 
Finally, concerned aid measure must have a potential effect on competition 
and trade between Member States. In order to evaluate distortion of 
competition, the position of the aid recipient prior to the receipt of aid 
compared to its actual or potential competitors in the relevant market should 
be considered. If this position has been improved then the condition in 
Article 87(1) EC will be met
41
. However there is no presumption that the 
grant of aid will result in a distortion of competition in any case
42
. The 
Commission should make an individual assessment in each case showing 
the actual or potential distortion of competition in the relevant market. 
 
Effect on inter-state trade is closely connected with the distortion of 
competition criterion. That is to say, if aid strengthens the financial position 
of an undertaking as compared with other undertakings competing in the 
Community then effect on intra-Community trade can be assumed to exist.
43
 
It is sufficient to establish that the beneficiary is pursuing an economic 
activity in a market where there is trade between Member States. In the 
financial sector, since the liberalization of financial services and the 
integration of financial markets are making intra-Community trade more 
and more sensitive to distortions of competition, an aid measure might 
easily be liable to have a distorting effect on intra-Community trade.
44
 
 
2.1.5 Derogations 
State interventions fulfilling the above-mentioned criteria under Article 
87(1) EC are regarded to be incompatible with the common market. In 
practice, incompatibility means that the aid measure is prohibited unless the 
Commission authorizes it. Exceptions to this rule can be found in Article 
87(2) and (3) of the Treaty.
45
 Article 87(2) of the EC Treaty specifies three 
                                                
40
 MEMO/08/202 “State aid: Commission launches in-depth investigation into UK 
restructuring aid package for 8orthern Rock- frequently asked questions”, Europa Press 
Releases 02/04/2008. 
41
 Case C-730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] E.C.R. 2671, para.11; 
Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] E.C.R. 709, para.17 
42 Cases C-296 & 318/82 8etherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v 
Commission [1985] E.C.R. 809, para.24 
43
 Case C-730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission [1980] E.C.R. 2671 
44
 Commission Decision 95/547/EC of 26 July 1995 giving conditional approval to aid 
granted by France to the bank Credit Lyonnais, OJ L/308, p. 92-119 
45
 In the case of credit institutions entrusted with performing services of general economic 
interest, Article 86(2) EC could also be relied to exclude the general prohibition on State 
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types of aid which shall be declared compatible with the common market. 
As the wording implies, these exemptions have an automatic nature. Types 
of exceptions listed under this provision include aids with a social character, 
aids to rectify damages caused by natural disasters and, finally, special aids 
to compensate for the economic disadvantage of Germany due to its 
division. Additionally, Article 87(3) EC encompasses some further 
exemptions but of a discretionary nature. The mere fact that the aid falls 
within one or more of the criteria laid down in this article may not be 
sufficient to be qualified for exemption. The Commission may check the 
compatibility of aid under Article 87(3) EC with other provisions of the 
Treaty
46
 and if aid schemes infringe other provisions of the Treaty, they are 
disqualified from exemption.
47
  
 
In financial services sector, there are two provisions which are generally 
considered as relevant for potential justifications of aid measures to credit 
institutions: 
 Article 87(3)(b) which provides derogation for “aid to promote the 
execution of an important project of common European interest or to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”, 
and; 
 Article 87(3)(c) which provides derogation for “aid to facilitate the 
development of certain activities or of certain economic areas, 
where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest”. 
 
The issue whether the public funding granted to an entity operating in the 
financial sector might be justified as a “remedy for a serious disturbance in 
the economy of a Member State” has been raised in many cases especially 
during the financial crises. For the first time, this question has been 
addressed in the Commission’s 1995 Credit Lyonnais decision
48
 where the 
Commission held that when the circumstances outside the control of the 
credit institutions cause a crisis of confidence resulting in a true systemic 
turmoil, the derogation in Article 87(3)(b) EC may be invoked. 
Additionally, aid has to be granted in a non-arbitrary way covering the 
whole system and amount of aid should be restricted to what is strictly 
necessary. The Commission has also paid attention to keeping distortive 
effects of the measure on the competition to a minimum by way of 
compensatory measures. In a way, the Commission was trying to ensure 
“quid pro quo” before the grant decision as far as possible. If distortion of 
competition is unavoidable, then sufficient compensatory measures 
                                                                                                                        
aids contained in Article 87(1) EC. However, considering the doubtful nature of the issue, 
application of this derogation remains within the discretion of the Commission. See Case 
C-280/00, Altmark Trans, [2003], ECR I-774, for further conditions attached to the 
application of exemption under Article 86(2) EC.  
46
 Rose M.D’Sa, (1998), “European Community Law on State Aid”, London Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
47 XXIIIrd Report on competition policy (1993), para.394, cited by Rose M.D’Sa, (1998). 
48
 Commission Decision 95/547/EC of 26 July 1995 giving conditional approval to aid 
granted by France to the bank Credit Lyonnais, OJ L/308. 
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benefitting competing undertakings must be taken to mitigate the harmful 
effects of the aid.
49
 
 
Moreover, the Commission asserted that the failure of one or more credit 
institutions does not necessarily lead to a system-wide crisis. On the other 
hand, the Commission has accepted the fact that in some cases the 
difficulties faced by a single credit institution may affect other credit 
institutions harmfully. However, for instance, the Commission did not 
accept the applicability of the derogation set out in Article 87(3)(b) of the 
Treaty to the aid granted to Credit Lyonnais because this measure was not 
designed to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy but only remedy 
the difficulties of a single undertaking. Actually, in that case problems 
encountered by Credit Lyonnais were not stemming from a banking crisis in 
France but largely caused by poorly designed risk monitoring policies of the 
company.
50
  
 
The Commission had a chance to investigate the probability of possible 
systemic crisis in many instances during the recent banking crisis. After a 
couple of years of being unresponsive to the crisis and being dependent on 
the pre-existing principles, the Commission finally recognized the systemic 
effects of the crisis in the financial services sector on the real economy. In 
that regard, the Commission adopted a Communication and set out detailed 
rules for application of exemption under Article 87(3)(b) EC. In some cases, 
the Commission even recognized that failing of a single credit institutions 
might produce harmful effects on the economy of a Member State. Further 
details will be provided in Chapter 4. 
 
On the other hand, Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty is more often relied as a 
possible justification of the State aid granted in financial services sector. 
The Commission continuously adopts guidelines and notices for exempting 
certain categories of State aid based on Article 87(3)(c) EC derogation. 2004 
Community Guidelines on State aid for rescue and restructuring firms in 
difficulty and the recent 2008 the Commission Notice on the application of 
Article 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees are two 
examples of the Commission’s act in that regard. Details of these legislative 
acts will be discussed in the next chapter.  
 
                                                
49
 Weenink, H. & Steinen, P.S. (2008), “State Aid in the Financial Services Sector”, 
Journal of International Banking and Regulation, 2008, 23(10), pp.514-522 
50
 Commission Decision 95/547/EC of 26 July 1995 giving conditional approval to aid 
granted by France to the bank Credit Lyonnais, OJ L/308. 
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3 Common Types of State Aid 
Granted in the Financial 
Services Sector 
After a brief examination of the main provisions for State intervention as 
contained in Article 87 of the Treaty, this chapter is designed to elaborate on 
the State aid granted in the financial services sector.  
 
Financial institutions play a very crucial role in the economy of a State since 
they bring stability to the market by providing credit and liquidity support. 
Importance of these institutions in the EU has increased dramatically during 
the recent years with the effect of rapid integration of the financial markets. 
In the era of financial globalization, failure of these institutions might be 
threatening to the economic development and growth of a society. Such 
failures might even lead to an overall institutional breakdown.
51
 Therefore, 
State authorities in the EU acted as a “lender of last resort” in many cases to 
protect the working status of their financial system and to avoid a financial 
institution from insolvency.  
 
In general, the financial difficulties experienced by the credit institutions 
may take two common forms namely; market illiquidity and funding 
illiquidity. Market illiquidity refers to the ease and speed with which credit 
institutions can trade their assets without causing a significant movement in 
the price and with low transaction costs. On the other hand, funding 
illiquidity refers to the ease with which credit institutions can obtain 
funding.
52
 Although these concepts are theoretically separate, they are 
dependent on each other. For instance, recent US sub-prime crisis on 
mortgages affected liquidity of these assets. Later, this liquidity problem 
spread to other assets and created a market illiquidity problem which then 
led to funding problems. Instruments for dealing with these difficulties are 
also different. Market liquidity is, in principle, provided by central banks 
through open market operations. Therefore, any measure adopted to tackle a 
problem encountered in that regard will be specific to that system or those 
central institutions. For funding illiquidity, there are three options available 
to solve that problem. First, private credit institutions or other market 
participants might provide funding to credit institutions experiencing 
funding illiquidity. Second option is to use public funds to support credit 
institutions. Finally, central banks might provide liquidity assistance to 
credit institutions experiencing funding illiquidity.
53
   
                                                
51
 Tsakatoura, A., (22 June 2002) EU Banking: State Aids in the EU Banking Industry, 
Inter-Lawyer, Lex-E Scripta Articles. 
52 Brunnermeier, M.K. & Pederson, L.H. (10 December 2008), Market Liquidity and 
Funding Liquidity, RFS Advance Access, Oxford University Press, p.1 
53
 Weenink, H. & Steinen, P.S. (2008), pp.514-522 
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However, State authorities should take into account the relevant EU 
legislation in their attempts to solve these problems and to maintain an 
efficient and healthy financial system. As we will see, a detailed analysis of 
the EU legislation and case law reveals that the Commission most 
commonly applies the rules concerning aids for rescuing and restructuring 
companies in difficulty and the rules concerning aids granted in the form of 
guarantees while assessing the compatibility of aid measures with the 
Treaty. The Commission applies these rules both for the cases where the 
State aid is granted directly to the financial institution and for the cases 
where State aid is granted to the clients or debtors of the institution but 
benefits the financial institution indirectly. In the next part, the rules for aids 
for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty, rules for aids in the form of 
guarantees will be analysed.
54
 In each section, analysis will be followed 
with case law analysis to exemplify the Commission’s approach in these 
specific types of measures.  
 
3.1 Rescue and Restructuring Aid 
Aid for rescue and restructuring (R&R) operations has given rise to some of 
the most controversial State aid cases during the precedent years. Mostly 
due to this controversial nature, the Commission continuously improved 
rules for the approval of rescue and restructuring aid by adopting several 
Community Guidelines. The first Community Guidelines on State aid for 
rescuing and restructuring companies in difficulty were adopted in 1994
55
 
and remained in force until 1999 when they were replaced by a revised 
version
56
 then lastly they have been modified in 2004
57
.  
 
R&R aid is undisputedly one of the most negative types of State aid 
distorting competition as acknowledged by the Court of First Instance in 
HAMSA
58
. By way of R&R aid, a company which runs into difficulties is 
kept artificially in the market by the State. However, this cannot be the norm 
because the exit of unprofitable firms is a normal part of the functioning of a 
market economy.
59
 Also, market exit of a firm in difficulty would create a 
chance for competitors to gain market force. Therefore, by rescuing such a 
firm competitors are prevented to increase their share in the market. In 
addition, State support can create some inappropriate incentives for the 
                                                
54
 There are also some other types of State aids granted in the financial services sector such 
as aids provided in the form of equity transfers, exclusive rights and reservation of banking 
activities, fiscal benefits and preferential taxation of credit institutions, and aid provided in 
the context of liquidation, transfer of assets and privatization. These relatively rare types of 
measures are outside scope of this paper.  
55
 Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, OJ 
1994 C368, p.12 
56
 Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, OJ 
1999 C288, p.2 
57
 Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, OJ 
2004 C244, p.2 
58
 Case T-152/99 HAMSA [2002] ECR II-3049, para.77 
59
 European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard, COM (2003) 636 final, 29.10.2003, p.13 
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failing firms. Aid granted to these companies enables them to act at a higher 
risk, engage in aggressive price races, or simply operate with low 
efficiency.
60
 
 
However, as mentioned before, State aid might facilitate the development of 
certain economic activities. Thus, the provision under Article 87(3)(c) of the 
Treaty could be a justification for R&R aid. The R&R Guidelines provide 
three complementary reasons for the Commission to allow State aid.
61
 
Accordingly, aid may be justified either by: 
 social or regional policy considerations (to prevent employment 
problems or to favour the development of an underdeveloped region) 
 the need to take into account the beneficial role played by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the economy (it is not designed 
for a single SME but to overcome the dimensional difficulties faced 
by SMEs in the economy), or 
 the desirability of maintaining a competitive market structure when 
the demise of firms could lead to a monopoly or to a tight 
oligopolistic situation.  
 
In addition, as the name of the Guideline implies, R&R aid should 
contribute to overcome the beneficiary company’s difficulties. The end goal 
of these grants is to restore company viability in the market so that investor 
will consider investing in these companies again.  
 
Finally, Article 87(3)(c) EC requires the rescue and restructuring aid to be 
proportionate to the objective pursued. In other words, the negative aspects 
of the State aid should not outweigh the positive effects. Instead the aid 
measure should strike a right balance between an objective that justifies the 
aid and the distortion of competition.
62
 Motivated by these concerns, the 
Commission provides a number of criteria in the Guideline to ensure that 
the R&R aid is proportionate. Max Lienemeyer in his contribution to “the 
EC State Aid Regime” groups these criteria into three main categories. 
Accordingly, the State aid must be: 
 appropriate to fulfil the objective (for instance, by enabling the 
company to overcome its difficulties and restoring the long-term 
viability of it), 
 necessary to achieve the objective (the aid granted should be the 
strict minimum necessary to achieve the goal), and 
 proportional (undue distortions of competition should be minimized 
with the help of compensatory measures if they cannot be avoided at 
all). 
 
These criteria constitute the main principles underlying the R&R Guideline 
and will be elaborated in the following chapters.  
                                                
60
 Lienemeyer, M. in his contribution to Rydelski, M.S., (2006), “The EC State Aid Regime: 
Distortive Effects of State Aid on Competition and Trade”, Cameron May, pp.183-184 
61
 R&R Guidelines, §8 
62
 Lienemeyer, M. in his contribution to Rydelski M.S., (2006), p.185 
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3.1.1 Eligibility for the Application of Guidelines 
For the application of Guidelines, firstly the beneficiary undertaking within 
the meaning of Article 87(1) EC should be identified. This process is 
relatively easy when the recipient undertaking is a single firm. However, it 
gets more complex if the aid recipient is a part of group of companies. The 
Guidelines state that a company belonging to a group is not normally 
eligible for the R&R aid because in such a case the group should help to the 
suffering unit with its own resources. However, if the difficulties are 
company-specific and are not result of an arbitrary allocation of costs within 
the group, or when the difficulties are too serious to be dealt with by the 
group itself
63
, then the firm in difficulty is still eligible for the R&R aid. The 
applicability of this criterion is highly criticized by 8icolaides and Kekelekis 
because the Commission assumes that the parent company will always be 
willing to support its subsidiary in financial difficulties.
64
 
 
Another important factor for the application of Guidelines is that the 
beneficiary undertaking should be in difficulty. Interestingly, there is no 
Community definition of when a company is in financial difficulties. Due to 
the differences in national insolvency laws and procedure, it is very difficult 
to derive a definition from the practice of Member States.
65
 However, the 
Commission provides a useful description in the Guideline. Accordingly, a 
firm will be regarded as being in difficulty “where it is unable, whether 
through its own resources or with the funds it is able to obtain from its 
owner/shareholders or creditors, to stem losses which, without outside 
intervention by the public authorities, will almost certainly condemn it to 
going out of business in the short or medium term”.
66
 This condition must 
be assessed ex ante.
67
 Another important issue is that the Commission’s 
determination of whether a company is in difficulty should not be based on 
severe criteria. It has to be kept in mind that the main objective of R&R aid 
is to restore the viability of the company. If the Commission waits too much 
to identify those difficulties, it might be too late for the company.  
 
Newly created firms
68
 are in principle not eligible for the R&R aid because 
these companies should commence their activities by considering the market 
situation.
69
 State aid cannot be used to reduce the risk involved in the 
creation of the company. However, this issue is also problematic because 
new firms also need to be sufficiently capitalized ab initio.
70
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 R&R Guideline, §13 
64 Nicolaides, P. & Kekelekis, M. (2004), pp.578-583 
65
 Nicolaides, P., Kekelekis, M. & Buyskes, P., (2005) State Aid Policy in the European 
Community: A Guide for Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, International 
Competition Law Series, Second Edition,  pp-111-114  
66 R&R Guidelines  §9 
67
 Commission Decision in Case C62/2000 Kahla, OJ 2003 L227, p.12, para.112 
68
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 Valle, E. & Van de Casteele, K., (2004), Revision of the State Aid Rescue and 
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Finally, it is crucial to remind that R&R Guidelines has privilege for the 
firms in difficulty meaning that when the aid beneficiary has financial 
difficulties, any other Guidelines cannot be applied if the aid measure is not 
exempted by a regulation.
71
 The Commission states that “a firm in difficulty 
cannot be considered an appropriate for promoting other policy 
objectives”. This is also applicable for the existing aid under approved 
schemes. For instance, if a regional aid recipient under an approved scheme 
starts to suffer from financial difficulties, the regional guidelines do not 
apply anymore.
72
 Instead any aid granted to that company has to be justified 
under the R&R Guidelines.  
3.1.2 Compatibility of Restructuring Aid 
Restructuring aid involves “a feasible, coherent and far-reaching plan to 
restore a firm’s long-term viability”.
73
 Therefore, restructuring generally 
entails the reorganization and rationalization of the firm’s activities on to a 
more efficient basis such as by withdrawing the loss-making activities or by 
restructuring the existing uncompetitive activities that can be restored. A 
restructuring aid does not necessarily include financial restructuring but also 
might imply a physical restructuring.
74
 However, a mere financial assistance 
designed to compensate past losses will not be considered as a restructuring 
aid within the scope of Guidelines but a pure operating aid incompatible 
with the common market.
75
  
 
Therefore, a restructuring plan including a series of measures to restore the 
long-term viability of the enterprise within a reasonable time
76
 on the basis 
of realistic assumptions is one of the core elements of restructuring aid. The 
Commission assesses the aid measure on the basis of this restructuring plan.  
 
Apart from restructuring plan, there is a number of criteria to be satisfied. 
The remaining requirements established by the Guidelines for considering a 
State aid for restructuring a firm in difficulty compatible with the common 
market are the following ones: 
 Restoration of financial and commercial viability, 
 The minimum necessary to restore viability, 
 No undue distortion of competition, and 
 The one-time last-time principle. 
                                                
71
 For example, Commission Regulation (EC) 69/2001 provides exemption for de minimis 
aid, OJ 2001 L10; Commission Regulation 68/2001 provides exemption for training aid, OJ 
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73 R&R Guidelines, §17. 
74
 Tsakatoura, A. (22 June 2002). 
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 Delfino, R., (2004), Credit Institutions and State Aids in EC Law, European Business 
Law Review, vol. 15, n° 4, pp. 775-810.  
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3.1.2.1 Restoration of financial and commercial 
viability 
The restructuring plan should include appropriate measures capable of 
bringing the company to long-term viability and enabling it to stand on its 
own feet. The Commission preferred to give a general definition of the 
performance expected from a viable firm instead of giving specific financial 
ratios for long-term viability.
77
 Accordingly, a viable firm should have an 
expected revenue sufficient to cover its financial outlays and operating costs 
including depreciation and ought to generate an acceptable return to its 
shareholders.  
 
There are mainly three restructuring options for the companies to 
implement.
78
 In operational restructuring, the firm should redirect its 
activities to regain the viability and ensure profitability. For that matter, 
loss-making activities should be abandoned and operating costs should be 
reduced. The company can even consider rationalization of geographical 
representation.
79
 Industrial restructuring requires the replacement of 
obsolete machinery and instead the installment of more efficient ones. 
Success of these measures has to be proven in the restructuring plan 
possibly by providing a simulation of future sales figures and prices. Such 
demonstrations are vital for the Commission’s assessment.
80
 Finally, in 
addition to restructuring measures for tackling the causes of the losses, the 
company needs financial restructuring for sustainability. The company 
should be viable in the long-run meaning that it has to survive on its own 
not only during good times but also during downturns.  
 
However, at the end of the day, the company has a wide margin of 
discretion in deciding which measures are the best for restoring its viability. 
Therefore, fulfillment of the restoration of viability criterion usually is not a 
problem.  
 
3.1.2.2 The minimum necessary to restore viability 
 
In order to limit the distortive effects, the State aid must be kept at a 
minimum. The beneficiary undertaking should not receive more aid than 
what is strictly necessary to implement its restructuring plan. At the same 
                                                
77
 However, the Commission welcomes the restructuring plans providing precise ratios as 
contained in a normal investment plan. Financial ratios commonly used in such plans are 
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time, aid beneficiaries should make a significant contribution to the 
restructuring plan from their own resources.  
 
Limitation of the aid amount to a minimum is especially important to avoid 
market-distorting activities not serving to the final objective; restoration of 
viability. The company cannot use the aid to expand its activities or 
undertake investments which are unrelated to restructuring. Nor can it use 
aid to acquire shares in other companies. The language of the Guidelines is 
rather strict in that context. An activity carried out by the firm might be 
useful for the company but for approval it has to be strictly necessary for 
restructuring.
81
 
 
After the amount of aid necessary for the restructuring is determined, the 
own contribution of the aid beneficiaries should be established. Aid 
beneficiaries are expected to contribute to the restructuring significantly by 
selling their assets not necessary for the firm’s survival or by raising money 
through external financing options. The company might divest its fixed 
assets or show them as collateral to get some loans from external sources. 
However, the Guidelines require the own contribution to be a genuine 
private contribution. Therefore, private loans backed up by State guarantee 
or loans on preferred rates cannot be counted as ‘own’ contribution. As the 
wording implies, the contribution should come from the owners or the 
owners’ efforts on the capital markets not from State resources directly or 
indirectly. Moreover, such contribution must be real. Thus, expected future 
profits or depreciation of long-term assets
82
 should be excluded from own 
contribution calculations.  
 
Once the elements of own contribution are determined, it must be compared 
with the overall cost of restructuring process. The Commission provides 
guidance on the size of this contribution in proportion to the size of the 
beneficiaries.
83
 Accordingly, the aid beneficiary’s contribution to the 
restructuring must be at least 25% in the case of small enterprises, at least 
40% for medium-sized enterprises and at least 50% for large firms. 
However, there are two exceptions from these pre-determined own 
contribution thresholds. Firstly, in exceptional circumstances and in cases of 
particular hardship, which must be demonstrated by the Member State, the 
Commission may accept a lower contribution.
84
 Unfortunately there is no 
definition of ‘exceptional circumstances’ and ‘extreme hardship’ in the 
Guideline. It can be argued that exceptional circumstances should apply to 
the situation of the firm in difficulty, while hardship should occur when the 
firm is going out of business.
85
 Second option, which is a more realistic 
exception, allows the Commission to lower own contribution in a case 
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where a beneficiary is operating in an assisted area.
86
 The Guidelines does 
not define the extent of reduction in such cases pointing that the 
Commission has a wide margin of discretion in adopting less stringent 
conditions.  
 
3.1.2.3 No undue distortion of competition 
In order to minimize the adverse effects on trading conditions, the company 
should compensate its competitors for the aid it receives. Previously, these 
compensatory measures are limited to sectors suffering from structural 
overcapacities. However, there is no justification for such a limitation 
because the aid might result in distortions of competition also in the sectors 
without structural overcapacities. Therefore, this approach is abandoned in 
new Guidelines. Compensatory measures are compulsory, irrespective of 
the sector. What matters is the degree of distortion only.
87
  
 
There are three types of compensatory measures accepted by the 
Commission: reductions in capacity or market presence, divestment of 
assets, or reduction of entry barriers on the markets concerned. In addition 
to commitments by the beneficiary, the Member States may also need to 
take legislative action. For instance, in Alstom case
88
 France was obliged to 
early transpose a public procurement directive to eliminate the tendency in 
the French market to give preference to national undertakings.
89
  
 
The Commission pays special attention to the compensatory measures in the 
markets where the firm will have a significant market share after 
restructuring. To this end, firstly the relevant market has to be determined. 
Unfortunately, the Guidelines do not provide any definition of the relevant 
market but it can be extracted from the Community competition law.
90
 
Secondly, the firm should have a significant market position in this market. 
Due to the lack of definition, it can be argued that the Commission has a 
wide discretion in determination of what constitutes a significant market 
position in a relevant market.
91
 Finally, compensatory measures must be in 
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proportion to the distortive effects of the aid. The degree of compensation 
will be established on a case-by-case analysis by taking into account the 
firm’s size and its importance on the market.  
 
There are three exceptions under this condition which need to be 
highlighted. Firstly, these restrictions are waived when the beneficiary is 
small enterprise because it is assumed that small enterprises do not normally 
distort competition to an extent contrary to the common interest.
92
 This 
exception needs to be clarified more in the Guidelines because there is no 
explanation for the favorable treatment of small companies apart from the 
implicit justification that they are too small. However, the EC courts have 
held that even very small amounts of aid might have distortive effects on 
intra-community trade and competition. Also, there is no definite 
relationship between the size of the company and its market share. A small 
company specialized in a small market or niche might have a significant 
market share. Furthermore, as 8icolaides and Kekelekis argued that if small 
companies do not need to compensate competitors because they do not have 
any significant impact on the economy, then why should they be saved?
93
 
Secondly, when the recipient is located in an assisted area, the extent of 
compensatory measures required by the Commission will be 
correspondingly lower.
94
 However, this process is also ambiguous because 
the Guidelines do not provide any explicit thresholds on how much less 
capacity reduction should be required in assisted areas. Consequently, 
neither the recipient companies, nor their competitors have any clear idea of 
what to expect.
95
 Finally, aid for social measures exclusively for the benefit 
of redundant employees is disregarded for the purposes of determining the 
extent of the compensatory measures.
96
 
 
3.1.2.4 The one-time last-time principle 
In order to prevent unfair distortions of competition, the Guidelines 
establish that aid to firms in difficulty should be granted only once. In 
practice, this means that companies cannot be rescued and restructured 
repeatedly. Otherwise, repeated grants would merely postpone the inevitable 
consequence, and in the meantime shift economic and social problems on to 
other, more efficient producers or other Member States. In other words, the 
discipline of the market will be removed. Therefore, the Member State must 
identify whether the current firm has already received R&R aid in the past, 
including any unnotified aid
97
. If so, and where less than 10 years have 
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elapsed since the rescue aid was granted or the restructuring period came to 
an end or implementation of the restructuring plan has been halted 
(whichever is the latest), the Commission will not allow further R&R aid.
98
  
 
Exceptions to the application of the one-time last-time principle are 
permitted in exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances for which the 
company is not responsible.
99
 These difficulties must be external to the 
company, implying a force majeure situation where the company has no 
power of influence. 
 
3.1.3 Compatibility of Rescue Aid 
Rescue aid is short-term assistance which makes it possible to keep a 
company in difficulty afloat for the time needed to work out a restructuring 
or liquidation plan that would bring it back to financial viability. Rescue aid 
is by nature temporary and reversible.
100
 Once a restructuring or liquidation 
plan for which the aid requested has been established and is being 
implemented, rescue aid is no longer available for the firm and all further 
aid will be considered as restructuring aid.
101
 However, as in restructuring 
aid, rescue aid shall not simply maintain the status quo and postpone the 
inevitable. Therefore, the Commission and the European Courts are cautious 
about the aid measures designed to keep a firm alive.
102
  
 
Point 25 in the Guidelines stipulates five cumulative conditions for the 
approval of rescue aid. Accordingly: 
 rescue aid shall consist of liquidity support in the form of loans or 
loan guarantees where the interest rate of loan granted shall be 
comparable to those observed for the loans to healthy firms, and in 
particular the reference rates adopted by the Commission;  
 loan and guarantee must be limited to six months unless the Member 
State has not submitted a restructuring plan within those six months 
and the Commission has not decided on the plan yet. In such a case, 
the rescue aid will normally be prolonged
103
; 
 the aid amount must be limited to the amount necessary to keep the 
firm in business for six months; 
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 the aid must be granted on the grounds of serious social difficulties 
and create no negative externalities on other Member States; and, 
 the company should not have benefited from any R&R aid in the last 
10 years.
104
 Rescue aid is also a one-off measure which is designed 
to keep a company in business for a limited period.  
 
Finally, considering the urgency problem of rescue aid cases, the 
Commission proposed a new simplified procedure in point 30 of the 
Guidelines. Accordingly, the Commission will endeavour to adopt a 
decision within a period of one month for cases where the firm is 
unquestionably a firm in financial difficulties and the amount of rescue aid 
is based on the past operating cash flow of the firm and does not exceed 
EUR 10 million. One could easily envisage that the Commission is 
suggesting, by adopting such a simplified procedure, a kind of block 
exemption approach for certain kinds of rescue aid.
105
 However, there are 
two problems attached to the new procedure. Firstly, the threshold of EUR 
10 million is relatively low compared to the size of companies asking for 
rescue aid. Therefore, the new procedure can be said to be limited in scope. 
In addition, the formula based on past operating cash flow might not always 
reveal the real future liquidity needs of the companies.  
3.1.4  Case Analysis 
The sub-chapters below analyse two decisions adopted by the Commission. 
In the area of R&R aid, there is dominance of French, Italian and German 
cases. Interestingly, these cases show very similar characteristics and 
resemble each other. Therefore, the two cases below are selected from these 
three Member States; one from France and other from Germany. Moreover, 
in order to provide a kind of historical evolution and differences in the 
Commission’s approach, if exist, two cases are selected through time; one 
from 1998 and other from 2005. More recent case laws during the time of 
financial crisis will be provided in Chapter 4. 
 
3.1.4.1 GAN Group 
In 1998 the Commission approved a restructuring aid granted by France for 
the ailing GAN group
106
. GAN, a State controlled banking and insurance 
group, not only was the fifth largest insurer in France in terms of turnover 
with wide operations abroad, but also controlled 93% of the Credit 
Industrial et Commercial (CIC) banking group, which was the fifth largest 
bank in the French Association of Banks. The difficulties experienced by 
GAN related both banking and insurance sections: its banking division had 
been hard-hit by the crisis in the property sector and the deterioration in the 
financial position of SMEs; its non-life insurance business had suffered the 
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consequences of the aggressive expansion strategy followed by a fall in the 
market. In 1995 the French Government had decided to support GAN 
through a capital injection of FRF 2.86 billion in the framework of a plan 
involving the privatization of CIC. The Commission had then considered the 
aid compatible with the common market due to the positive effects of the 
privatization in the market.
107
  
 
However, the privatization was subsequently suspended because GAN’s 
turnovers turned out to be less encouraging than envisaged. As a result, the 
French Government decided to intervene again with an additional aid 
amounting to FRF 20 billion which is almost seven times bigger than the 
original aid. This aid package might be broken down as follows: 
 a capital injection of FRF 11 billion to give the insurance companies 
an appropriate financial structure and to restore the capital base 
requirements of UIC ( a property development subsidiary of GAN), 
 a government commitment to cover the estimated losses of FRF 9 
billion which GAN would incur in implementing guarantees that it 
would have to provide, as part of the restructuring plan, for loans 
granted to the hived-off property company, Baticredit Finance et 
Cie. 
 
The Commission then decided to initiate formal proceedings in respect of 
both the new and old aid packages to GAN. After re-examining the 
compatibility of previous aid package (capital injection of FRF 2.86 billion) 
in the light of the new aid package, the Commission decided to approve 
restructuring aid to GAN subject to various conditions. These conditions 
included in particular: 
 the reduction of GAN’s insurance operations outside France by 50% 
 the sale of GAN’s insurance business, of its banking group CIC and 
of other subsidiaries according to a sale procedure aimed at 
maximizing the revenues and at ensuring the future long term 
viability of the companies sold. 
 
These conditions prove that the Commission is quite sensitive on 
compensatory measures. However, at the same time the Commission seeks 
for a balance between these measures and the objective of the aid granted. In 
other words, compensatory measures undertaken should be sufficient to 
offset the distortion of competition in the sector. However, these measures 
should be balanced against the objective of the restructuring aid which the 
long term viability of the company. Therefore, compensatory measures 
should be adjusted not to put the long term viability of the company at risk.  
 
The Commission also rejected the French Government’s argument that the 
restructuring of GAN would be less costly for the French Government in its 
capacity as authority responsible for monetary and financial stability. 
According to the Commission, acceptance of such an argument would imply 
an unacceptable discrimination between public and private companies.  
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Finally, GAN case is particularly interesting because the Commission 
developed some policy considerations on the corporate governance of 
publicly owned enterprises and on the moral hazard involved in their 
operations. The difficulties encountered by the GAN group revealed that the 
group’s corporate governance was not adequate. The Commission stated 
that GAN’s slowness in reacting to the cyclical downturn and slowness of 
the recovery process was a result of the confidence which its top 
management had placed in the State as shareholder. Obviously only the 
public institutions could count on such State aid but private ones are forced 
by the market forces to restructure drastically or enter into a composition 
arrangement. Therefore, State’s support, implicit or explicit, to public 
institutions make it easy for them to follow such speculative and hazardous 
policies. According to the Commission; 
“there is reason to believe that, if GA8 had not had the implicit or explicit 
support of the State, it would not have embarked upon the hazardous policy 
it did embark upon, or that at all events it would have restructured earlier 
and with greater determination.”
 108
 
 
Therefore, State support to GAN delayed the necessary corrective action 
and increased the final amount of State aid. The Commission emphasized 
that such unwarranted and excessive protection had “the effect of 
encouraging the unsound management of credit institutions” and resulted 
moral hazard problems.  
 
3.1.4.2 Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG 
The case concerns restructuring aid to the German lending group 
Bankgeselleschaft Berlin AG (hereinafter BGB).
109
 BGB was formed in 
1994 by the incorporation of several credit institutions formerly controlled 
by the Land of Berlin which was one of the main shareholders holding 
roughly 81% of BGB’s shares. BGB’s core business was retail banking for 
private and corporate customers. Apart from retail banking, real estate 
financing and real estate services, BGB and its subsidiaries were also 
operating on capital markets; money and security dealings. BGB was one of 
the 12 biggest banks in Germany in 2002 and by far the market leader in 
retail banking in the Berlin area.  
 
However, in the first half of 2001 BGB found itself in acute difficulty 
mainly because of high-risk real estate transactions such as imprudent rent 
and repurchase guarantees given to investors in real estate funds. In order to 
alleviate the financial losses, the majority shareholder Land of Berlin 
injected a fresh capital amounting to € 1.755 billion. The Commission 
authorized this measure as rescue aid.  
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In the following months, however, further risks were identified, especially 
in the real estate services operated by BGB’s subsidiaries. During this 
period, BGB was threatened with temporary closure by the Supervisory 
Office if it did not take measures to provision these risks. Therefore, as a 
second measure the Land of Berlin provided risk guarantees (the so-called 
risk shield) to cover these new risks up to a theoretical maximum of € 21.6 
billion for 30 years. In the worst case scenario, the economic value of these 
guarantees can be assessed at € 6.1 billion. Germany notified these measures 
as restructuring aid. Since these measures fall under the restriction laid 
down in Article 87(1) EC, the Commission started formal investigation 
procedure. During its first analysis, the Commission drew attention to the 
fact that a repayment agreement between the Land of Berlin and BGB 
regarding a potential recovery of a case pending in the Commission could 
also be considered as a State aid. This agreement was valued at up to € 1.8 
billion.  
 
In its analysis, the Commission firstly established that these three measures 
are considered as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. However, 
they might be considered compatible with the common market based on the 
exemption laid down in Article 87(3)(c) EC. In the Commission’s view, the 
only guidelines applicable for that purpose were those on State aid for 
rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. The Commission then 
assessed the aid measures against the three main criteria set forth in the 
R&R Guidelines.  
 
The Commission first demonstrated that BGB should be regarded as a firm 
in difficulty. The fact that BGB had been supported by its majority 
shareholder, Land of Berlin, and had benefitted from these measures before 
its business activities were terminated cannot change this conclusion. It was 
obvious that a market economy investor would not have provided those 
resources on the same terms. The Commission then analyzed the structural 
and operational deficits responsible for the difficulties. Such an analysis was 
essential to assess the effectiveness of those measures and the restoration of 
long-term viability of BGB.  
 
Regarding the restoration of long-term viability, the Commission’s 
assessment was based on an expert study clarifying the sufficiency of 
BGB’s risk provisions and risk management. After incorporating those 
recommendations, the Commission concluded that the restructuring 
measures already carried out and those planned for the future are reasonable, 
logical and fundamentally appropriate in order to enable BGB to restore its 
long-term viability.
110
 Although there were some continuing uncertainties 
for future developments, the restructuring plan provided for a substantial 
reduction in risky assets and restricted the bank to its core business in the 
future. The Commission warned that the prospects for viability were 
dependent to a large extent on future profits, on the ability to generate new 
                                                
110
 Commission Notice IP/04/234 of 18 February 2004, Commission approves aid for 
restructuring of Bankgesellschaft Berlin 
 30 
business and on the restructuring plan being implemented in full. The 
Commission also considered that the privatization of the bank after the 
restructuring period would have a positive effect on further improving 
BGB’s profitability because the Commission assumes that an investor, 
following the bank’s privatization, would take all necessary measures to 
achieve for the bank a level of profitability that would be acceptable to a 
market-economy investor. As in GA8 case, the Commission considers the 
public involvement as a problem and proposes privatization as a remedy. 
Underlying assumptions of the Commission regarding privatization are 
highly questionable. By way of privatization, the Commission might be 
suggesting market forces to decide for each and every company. However, 
as mentioned before, adoption of R&R Guidelines in principle eliminates 
the role of market forces in a market to a large extent.  
 
Regarding the avoidance of undue distortions of competition, the 
Commission considered that the sales, closures, and reduction of 
subsidiaries, assets and lines of business offered as compensatory measures 
were sufficient to mitigate the distortive effects of the aid measures. These 
compensatory measures included the commitments to reduce BGB’s strong 
position in the Berlin retail banking market by the divestment of Berliner 
Bank, one of BGB’s two retail brands, and attached business, to hive-off the 
real estate services subsidiaries, and, finally, to sell BGB by the end of 
2007. The restructuring plan also provided several other commitments such 
as divestment of Berlin-based Wederbank and the sale or closure of national 
and foreign branches and subsidiaries. Divestiture of real estate services, 
which was the main reason of the crisis, reveals the Commission’s concern 
for the balance; adequacy of compensatory measures on the one hand and 
long-term viability of the company on the other. The abundance of these 
measures shows not only the Commission’s harshness while assessing 
compensatory measures but also the fact that the Commission takes into 
account of the relative importance of the firm on its market.  
 
Regarding limitation of the aid to the minimum, the Commission concluded 
that the amounts of three aid measures granted – the capital injection, the 
risk shield and the agreement on the treatment of any claims to repayment 
brought against the bank by the Land of Berlin – are limited to the strict 
minimum necessary to enable BGB’s restructuring. Existing financial 
resources of BGB and its shareholders were taken into account by the 
Commission. The Commission also considered the fact that the bank did not 
receive any surplus cash or surplus own resources which it could have 
misused for the purposes of an unreasonable expansion of its business at the 
expense of its competitors.  
 
As a result, the three aid measures totaling to EUR 9.7 billion were 
considered as aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC but declared 
compatible with the common market based on the R&R Guidelines.  
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3.2 State Guarantees  
Another common type of State aid to financial institutions is the aid granted 
in the form of guarantees. State guarantees do not imply a direct injection of 
funds from the State to the guaranteed firm. Within the context of financial 
services, it means that the State promises to ensure the well functioning of 
the credit institution by injecting funds when the bank faces liquidity 
problems or by responding directly against the claims of his creditors when 
the assets of the bank were not sufficient to repay all the debts. However, for 
many governments, guarantees are seen as convenient instruments not only 
because they do not involve any funding but also they allow the 
governments to pursue a fair amount of development policy.
111
 
Governments could easily support the development of companies and 
facilitate their access to finance which is particularly important for SMEs.  
 
In many cases, guarantees are non-transparent aid because it is very difficult 
to quantify a guarantee especially when it has not been called. Since these 
guarantees are in a way invisible and do not appear explicitly as aid –but 
guarantees- in the national budget, they often escaped the scrutiny of the 
Commission.
112
 However, when the Commission accidentally came upon 
guarantees in EFIM case
113
, it had realized that something has to be done. 
For that purpose, the Commission collected the applicable rules in its first 
Commission Notice on guarantees.
114
 Since its adoption, the Commission 
dealt with several major cases which drew the public attention to State aids 
awarded by means of State guarantees.
115
 These cases also proved how 
difficult it is for the Commission to determine the existence and amount of 
aid granted through explicit or implicit guarantees. Unfortunately, the text 
of this Notice was unnecessarily complex and some issues of crucial 
importance were left open to different interpretations.
116
 In view of that, 
State Aid Action Plan (SAAP)
117
 drew attention to the necessity of the 
revision of Notice on guarantees for clarification and simplification of State 
aid rules. Finally, in 2008, the rules applicable to aids in the form of 
guarantees are contained in a revised Commission Notice.
118
 The revised 
Commission Notice on guarantees aims to provide additional guidance and 
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legal certainty to Member States and stakeholders when assessing whether a 
guarantee contains an element of State aid.
119
  
3.2.1 Scope of the Commission Notice 
The Notice applies to all economic sectors, including financial services 
sector, without prejudice to specific rules adopted for the guarantees in the 
sector concerned. Furthermore, the Commission keeps neutrality as regards 
public and private ownership. Thus, in compliance with the Article 295 of 
the Treaty, the Notice does not prejudice the rules governing the system of 
property ownership in the Member States. The Notice also sets out 
particular rules for SMEs which will allow them to assess the aid element of 
a guarantee in a simple way. However, the scope of this study does not 
cover those specific rules.  
 
The scope of application of the Notice is very wide. It covers all forms of 
guarantees where a transfer of risk takes place
120
. Although, the Notice does 
not delineate what exactly has to be understood from a transfer of risk, it 
suggests taking into consideration whether the risk of the lender is 
diminished following the granting of a guarantee by the State. In other 
words, the risk associated with the guarantees should be carried, partially or 
wholly, by the public entity
121
 providing the guarantee. 
 
The most common guarantees are associated with a loan or another financial 
obligation contracted by a borrower from a lender. They may be granted as 
individual guarantees
122
 or within guarantee schemes
123
. Guarantees may 
take various forms depending on their legal basis, the type of transaction 
covered or their duration. The Commission provides a non-exhaustive list of 
common forms of guarantees.
124
 Accordingly, in addition to explicit 
guarantees such as a contractual guarantee, the Commission pays special 
attention to implicit forms of guarantees, sometimes referred as “soft 
guarantees”. Letters of comfort or political declarations might contain a 
transfer of risk when announcing that a company can rely upon the support 
of the State.
125
 Oral commitments and side letters are also caught with the 
same provision. Such commitments constitute a guarantee as soon as it 
becomes obvious that the State intervention diminishes the risk to be borne 
by the lender.  
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3.2.2 Aid Element 
The Notice does not lay down any new principles of assessment by which 
the Commission will apply the State aid rules to State guarantees. As 
mentioned before, the Commission’s main goal was to make the basis on 
which the Commission applies existing principles more transparent. Thus, 
general criteria set forth in Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty equally 
apply to guarantees.  
 
Even though the Commission used a fairly broad language in the Notice, it 
does not mean that all State guarantees amount to aid. The basic 
jurisdictional requirements of Article 87(1) EC should be satisfied to 
consider a guarantee as an aid. In that respect, the Commission confirms 
that the assessment of whether a State guarantee entails any State aid should 
be based on the Market Economy Investor Test.
126
  Accordingly, the 
guarantees provided by the State authorities can be considered to be 
compatible with the EC State aid rules, if they are made under conditions 
that a private market investor would have accepted. As stated before, in case 
of guarantees the risk associated with the guarantee is generally carried by 
the State. Therefore, State’s act of carrying such risks should be 
compensated by an appropriate premium which is acceptable by a private 
investor operating under normal market economic conditions. In that regard, 
an evaluation of borrower’s creditworthiness would be essential to 
determine the market premium of the guarantee he has to pay. If the State 
forgoes all or part of such a premium, then there is both an advantage to the 
recipient and transfer of State resources. Thus, actual State payments under 
a guarantee are not necessarily a requirement for a guarantee to fall under 
Article 87(1) of the Treaty and be considered as State aid. Such general 
approach to guarantees is confirmed by the CFI in EPAC case where it held 
that:  
“with regard to the absence of a transfer of State resources, the advantage 
conferred will entail an additional burden for the State budget in the event 
of implementation of the guarantee. (…) Accordingly, the grant of a 
guarantee by the State cannot avoid the prohibition in Article 87 of the 
Treaty merely because that advantage was not conferred on the beneficiary 
undertaking by way of a direct and clear mobilisation of State resources.”
127
 
The Commission considers that the aid is granted at the moment when the 
guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is called upon nor when 
payments are made under the terms of the guarantee.
128
  
 
The Notice mentions two types of possible beneficiaries of the guarantees; 
borrower and lender. State aid is normally involved if the borrower is able 
to raise funds at lower costs than would be possible without the guarantee or 
when the borrower could not get the loan at all without State guarantee. 
However, under certain circumstances, a State guarantee might equally give 
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rise to State aid to the lender. Both of these cases are relevant for the 
financial services sector. Firstly, the credit institutions can be the direct 
beneficiaries of the aid, for example, when they operate under a public 
guarantee, the so-called “refinancing guarantees”, to such an extent as to 
allow them to reduce their cost of lending;
129
 or when the State acquired a 
holding in a credit institution where unlimited liability is accepted instead of 
limited liability.
130
 Such direct advantage to credit institutions is so typical 
for the financial services sector because only beneficiaries professionally 
engaged in the financial sector can derive a significant amount of reduction 
in their lending costs structure from such guarantees.  
 
Credit institutions can also be the indirect beneficiaries of the guarantee 
especially when they grant financing to their clients who provide them with 
public guarantees, the so-called “loan guarantees”. In this case, the 
guarantee advantage is transferred to the undertakings being financed 
through a reduced interest rate for the loan. However, credit institutions still 
get the benefit because they derive additional loan intermediation and 
transaction costs due to the attractiveness of a loan backed up by a public 
guarantee.
131
 In other words, because of public loan guarantees credit 
institutions grant loans which they would not have granted under normal 
market conditions. When the guarantees contains aid to the lender, the 
Notice calls attention to the fact that such aid might, in principle, constitute 
operating aid which may be incompatible with the common market.
132
 
3.2.3 Conditions Excluding the Existence of Aid 
Although it can be argued that payment of premium for a State guarantee 
should be enough to exclude the existence of aid, the Notice adopts a stricter 
approach and identifies a list of conditions that have to be satisfied for 
reaching such a conclusion.  
 
In the case of an individual State guarantee, the Notice sets out four 
conditions to be fulfilled
133
: 
 the borrower is not in financial difficulty
134
; 
 the guarantee is linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed 
maximum amount and limited in time; 
 the guarantee does not cover more than 80% of the outstanding loan 
or other financial obligation
135
; and 
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 the market price is paid for the guarantee.  
 
The last two conditions need further clarification. The 80% rule for 
guarantees as mentioned in third condition is established to encourage 
lenders to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers properly and to make 
sure that the proper collateral is provided. The Commission believes that if a 
financial obligation is wholly covered by a State guarantee, the lender will 
have less incentive to properly assess, secure and minimize the risk arising 
from the lending operation. Consequently, loans will be contracted at a 
greater risk than the normal commercial risk and as a result the amount of 
higher-risk guarantees in the State’s portfolio will increase.
136
 For the 
purpose of ensuring that the lender bears part of the risk, when the loan 
starts to be reimbursed, the guaranteed amount has to decrease 
proportionally. So that at any time the guarantee will not cover more than 
80% of the outstanding loan or financial obligation. In a similar manner, 
losses incurred should be borne by the lender and guarantor proportionally. 
Any revenue generated from securities has to be attributed to the lender and 
guarantor on a proportional basis. Transactions where losses are fully 
attributed to the guarantor first, without immediate and proportional 
recourse to the lender, do not fulfil the 80% criterion. However, in case of a 
failure to satisfy 80% condition, there is no automatic assumption of the 
existence of aid. If Member States want to provide such a guarantee, the 
only thing they have to do is to notify the Commission and explain the 
reasons of the chosen structure. If the guarantee concerned fulfils the Market 
Economy Investor Principle (MEIP), it will still be considered to be free of 
aid.
137
 
 
With regard to the assessment of the market price, the Notice refers to two 
possibilities. As mentioned before, risk-carrying by a State guarantor should 
be remunerated by an appropriate premium. When the price paid for the 
guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium 
benchmark
138
, which can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee 
does not contain aid. However, if there is no matching guarantee premium 
benchmark on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the 
guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee 
premium should be compared to the market price of a similar non-
guaranteed loan.
139
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In the case of guarantee schemes, the conditions that must be fulfilled in 
order to rule out the existence of aid are as follows
140
: 
 no guarantee can be provided to borrowers in financial difficulty; 
 the guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a 
fixed maximum amount and limited in time; 
 the guarantees cannot cover more than 80% of the outstanding loan; 
 the terms of the scheme must be based on a realistic assessment of 
the risk, so that the premiums make it self-financing; 
 the adequacy of the level of the premiums has to be reviewed at least 
once a year; 
 the premiums charged have to cover the normal risks associated with 
granting the guarantee, the administrative costs of the scheme, and a 
yearly remuneration of an adequate capital; 
 the scheme must provide for the terms on which future guarantees 
will be granted.  
 
Self-financing nature of the guarantee schemes is the key element in the 
valuation of schemes. This condition refers to the market price premium 
condition within the context of individual guarantees. The Commission pays 
special attention to risk-adjusted premiums while assessing whether a 
guarantee scheme might be considered as self-financing. By this way, it is 
ensured that all projects are charged with premiums that correspond to their 
respective risk levels. Accordingly, a potentially higher rate of default 
incurred with riskier projects is remedied by higher revenues gathered 
through higher premiums. Similarly, the lower premiums charged to lower 
risks ensure that the scheme is still attractive for those projects. That is why, 
the Notice requires that the risk of each new guarantee has to be assessed on 
the basis of all the relevant factors such as quality of the borrower, 
securities, duration of the guarantee etc. Based on this risk analysis, risk 
classes have to be defined, the guarantee has to be classified in one of these 
risk classes and the corresponding guarantee premium should be charged.
141
  
3.2.4 Improvements and Some Practical 
Difficulties 
The new revised version of the Notice on Guarantees eliminates many 
problems encountered with the older version.
142
 Most of the unclear 
formulations have been improved and inconsistencies have been removed. 
For instance, the new Notice emphasizes the importance of MEIP and 
provides further clarification on that. At some certain points, there are clear 
references to market price and acts of private investor operating under 
normal market economy conditions. The new Notice also adopts a risk 
differentiation mechanism and adjusts the premiums accordingly. Moreover, 
the new Notice provides sufficient guidance on implicit guarantees or other 
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equivalent forms of support and their various forms. Now, there is a clear 
reference to R&R Guidelines for the definition of “firms in difficulty”.
143
 
However, there are still some problematic points which need further 
attention.  
 
To start with, one should ask whether it is appropriate and desirable to put a 
list of conditions which exclude the existence of an aid element in any given 
State guarantee. It is obvious that the circumstances surrounding the 
company and the public body and also terms and conditions attached to a 
guarantee can be extremely diverse. Therefore, it might not be a totally 
effective exercise to put an exhaustive and comprehensive list of conditions 
which exclude the existence of aid.
144
 
 
Secondly, although there are certain criticisms in the literature,
145
 the 
Commission preferred to keep 80% rule in the revised version. The rationale 
of this rule, as explained before, is clear but it should be emphasized that the 
80% rule is an “arbitrary limit invented by the Commission, which has no 
firm legal basis”.
146
 Actually, it may be thought as pure and simple 
application of the MEIP. Indeed, a guarantee covering a higher percentage 
of a loan could still be considered to be free of aid, if the premium paid by 
the beneficiary is adequate reflecting all the risks incurred by the State. 
Again, this is simply the application of the MEIP. Then, why the Notice is 
providing these unnecessarily complex and perhaps not fully correct ratios 
instead of giving further guidance on the general application of the MEIP 
with regard to guarantee measures? Therefore, the EC legislator should 
consider whether it would not be more useful and simple with the latter one 
while skipping the 80% rule. 
 
3.2.5  Case Analysis 
The section below provides an analysis of the Commission decision for the 
provision of Anstaltslast and Gewährträgerhaftung used in Germany. This 
case reveals the Commission’s general approach with regard to State 
guarantees. This is approved in later decisions of the Commission such as 
State guarantee of Ausfallhaftung in Austria
147
 and State guarantee by the 
Caisse des Depots et Consignations in France
148
.  
 
3.2.5.1 Anstaltslat and Gewährträgerhaftung  
The German banking system comprises various credit institutions 
specialized on diversified functions. Beside the large private banking 
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groups, the system includes a great number of public banks. These public 
banks had always been an important tool for the municipalities and Landers 
to provide a variety of public services such as serving local and less 
structured clients, particularly SMEs, sole entrepreneurships and farmers.
149
 
The public banks in Germany enjoy various advantages compared to private 
banks. Firstly, they do not face liquidity problems and do not have to go to 
the capital market in search of equity capital because the State provides 
these loans when they are necessary. Secondly, the rates of return paid by 
public banks to their owners (the State or municipalities) are usually much 
lower than the rates of return paid by private banks to their shareholders. 
Finally, the public banks can also retain a higher amount of profit. No 
private investor can have as much resources as the State. This gives the 
public banks an extra advantage for expanding their business at the expense 
of their private counterparts.
150
 
 
Apart from these obvious advantages, two guarantees had been traditionally 
used in the German public banking sector; “Anstaltslast” and 
“Gewährträgerhaftung”. The Anstaltslast corresponds to a maintenance 
obligation where “the guarantor is obliged to secure the economic basis of 
Anstalt, to maintain it functioning for the complete duration of its existence 
and to cover possible financial gaps through the use of subsidies or other 
appropriate means”.
151
 Since this guarantee is provided without 
remuneration and is unlimited both in duration and time, it is almost 
impossible for public banks to go bankruptcy. However, if it happens, then 
the creditors and depositors of the bank are covered by a second type of 
guarantee, the so-called Gewährträgerhaftung. Gewährträgerhaftung refers 
to a guarantee obligation which creates the obligation for the guarantor to 
step in during the insolvency or liquidation of the credit institution and 
creates direct claims of the creditors of the credit institutions against the 
guarantor.
152
 The existence of these two types of guarantees improves the 
creditworthiness and the financing conditions of German public banks in 
comparison to their private competitors. A public bank backed up by these 
guarantees can take higher risks and invest in some risky derivatives that 
cannot be carried out by the private banks. In exchange for public support, 
the German public banks had carried out some certain public interest 
lending activities. However, at the end, this resulted in a reserved market 
where public banks assumed a dominant position to provide local loans.
153
 
 
Having this background, in 1991 the European Banking Federation filed a 
complaint against the public guarantees granted by Germany. Following its 
examination, the Commission reached a preliminary conclusion that both 
guarantees fulfill the conditions laid down in Article 87(1) of the Treaty and 
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consequently should be regarded as aid. Moreover, the Commission 
considered that no possible exemption under the State aid rules was 
applicable in this case. Germany argued that these guarantees were a kind of 
compensation for the public services carried out by the public banks. 
However, the Commission had certain doubts on whether these guarantees 
could be represent a compensation for the provision of services of general 
economic interest. Further more, since these guarantees existed before the 
entry into force of the EC Treaty, they have to be treated as existing aid 
within the meaning of the Procedural Regulation.
154
 Therefore these 
guarantees should be eliminated provisionally following a transitional 
period determined by the Commission.  
 
After that, the Commission requested Germany to bring State guarantees for 
public banks into line with EC law and provided several recommendations 
in that regard.
155
 Germany agreed on the implementation of these 
recommendations.
156
 Pursuant to the agreement, a “platform model” had 
been adopted. Accordingly, Gewährträgerhaftung would have been 
abolished and Anstaltslast would be replaced with a normal commercial 
owner relationship governed by the market economy principles just like 
between a private shareholder and a limited liability company. Furthermore, 
any obligation of the public owner to grant economic support to the public 
credit institution would be excluded. There would be no unlimited liability 
of the owner for the liabilities of the public credit institution. Also any 
declaration of intent or guarantee to ensure the existence of public credit 
institutions would be abolished. Finally, same insolvency rules shall apply 
both to the private credit institutions and public ones. In other words, 
creditors of public credit institutions should be treated equally as the 
creditors of private credit institutions.
157
 The agreement anticipated a four 
year transition period ending on 18 July 2005 during which Anstaltslast and 
Gewährträgerhaftung can be maintained in their present form. Liabilities 
existing before the date of acceptance of the agreement will continue to be 
covered by Gewährträgerhaftung until their maturity runs out based on the 
condition that its maturity does not go beyond 31 December 2015. 
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4 State Aid Rules in the 
Context of the Current 
Financial Crisis  
European Union is now experiencing a “once-in-a-lifetime crisis”. The 
financial turmoil started in August 2007 with reckless real estate lending in 
the USA. People believed that there was no reason to be concerned about 
the stability of the European financial system. However, this illusion 
disappeared in mid-September 2007 with the images of British people 
queuing to withdraw their deposits from branches of UK mortgage bank 
Northern Rock. Northern Rock was a warning that the crisis could cross the 
Atlantic. Policy makers in the Union were aware of the horrific 
consequences of financial markets’ seizure as experienced during 1930s.
158
 
However, Northern Rock signal was not recognized fully and in the 
following months the crisis dispersed to credit institutions with a particular 
risk profile. Member States and the Commission were dealing with these 
failing credit institutions on case-by-case basis instead of uniting and 
adopting a general measure. The European Central Bank and the central 
banks of the Member States started to inject huge amounts of liquidity into 
markets to prevent a severe credit crunch.
159
 However, trust among financial 
institutions continued to disappear and there were serious risks that the fear 
might spread to other industries and hit the real economy in general. The 
European banking sector was clearly in difficulties.  
 
In the second phase, the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 2008 
started a general crisis of confidence. Credit institutions were in need of 
refinancing measures due to the extraordinary freeze in inter-bank lending. 
The crisis was no longer one of individual banks, but a systemic one of the 
entire banking system.
160
 Due to the vital role played by the credit 
institutions in the economy, the crisis spilled into other sectors as well. Jobs 
and businesses have been destroyed on a massive scale. In short, the 
European Union is experiencing a real economic downturn. 
 
During the ongoing crisis, the State aid rules played an important role in 
tackling the financial and economic crisis and enabled the Commission to be 
involved in the management of crisis. The State aid rules emerged as a tool 
for “positive” economic policy coordination rather than solely for 
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“negative” control of compliance with the EC Treaty.
161
 In that respect, the 
message delivered by the Commissioner 8eelie Kroes was clear enough: 
“by applying the EU’s State aid policy and working together with Member 
States, the European Commission is determined to ensure that fewer jobs 
are lost and that the recession is shorter and shallower than it would 
otherwise be. (…) The best way to limit job losses and economic damage is 
to maintain the integrity of Europe’s Single Market through, amongst other 
things, the application of the EU’s State aid policy.”
162
 
 
However, the Commission’s response to the crisis differed depending on the 
time and how harsh the crisis is. Indeed, two phases can be identified 
chronologically so far. Phase I covers a period of September 2007, when the 
crisis hit Europe by Northern Rock, and September 2008, the Chapter 11 
bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers. Phase II covers the period after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The next two chapters provide an analysis of 
how the Commission reacted to the crisis during these periods.  
 
4.1 Phase I – Adherence to Existing 
Measures 
In phase I, the primary concern of the Commission was to ensure consistent 
implementation of the EC State aid rules. The Commission reacted to the 
subprime crisis by taking necessary actions to reassure markets that the 
rescue measures adopted by the Member States were “not going to be 
jeopardized by EU rules”.
163
 Notwithstanding the exceptional nature of the 
crisis and the calls for greater flexibility from the Member States, the 
Commission has preferred to rely on established practices in dealing with 
the cases have arisen within the context of financial crisis. The Commission 
stated that, contrary to what some Member States argued, the existing legal 
framework is flexible enough to accommodate exceptional and country-
specific circumstances.
164
 Therefore, up until September 2008, the 
Commission examined rescue measures adopted by Member States to 
address the difficulties of their credit institutions on the basis of the R&R 
Guidelines. As mentioned before, this Guidelines are adopted pursuant to 
Article 87(3)(c) EC. Therefore, during the phase I period, the Commission 
was keen on using the exemption laid down under Article 87(3)(c) EC while 
constantly refusing to authorize rescue measures pursuant to Article 
87(3)(b) of the Treaty.  
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Over phase I period, the Commission has adopted six decisions and 
authorized six individual rescue packages on the basis of the R&R 
Guidelines.
165
 One common property of all these cases was that the 
Commission approved respective rescue measures on the basis of Article 
87(3)(c) EC under strict conditions
166
 and refused to apply Article 87(3)(b) 
EC. According to the Commission, the justification under Article 87(3)(b) 
“needs to be applied restrictively so that aid cannot be benefitting only one 
company or one sector but must tackle a disturbance in the entire economy 
of a Member State.”
167
 Obviously, the Commission did not consider the risk 
that bank failures in UK, Denmark or Germany could start a systemic 
crisis.
168
 Instead, the Commission viewed those cases as “individual 
problems” requiring “tailor made remedies, which can be addressed under 
the rules for companies in difficulty”.
169
  
 
The sections below provide two case analyses to exemplify the 
Commission’s approach during Phase I period.  Cases are selected to give a 
complete picture of the Commission’s attitude for rescuing and restructuring 
firms during this time period. Therefore, Northern Rock case refers to a 
rescue aid package while Sachsen LB deals with restructuring aid.  
4.1.1 UK Rescue Aid Package for Northern 
Rock 
Northern Rock is the 5
th
 biggest mortgage bank in UK with a total balance 
sheet of £ 101 billion as of 31.12.2006.
170
 Northern Rock’s main activity is 
residential mortgage lending which represents more than 90% of all 
outstanding loans. Lending activities of the bank have increased 
significantly over the last 8 years. Whole sale funding and in particular 
securitization of assets constituted the main source of financing during the 
growth period which means a change in the structure of the bank’s liabilities 
unlike most UK banks.  
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As a result of the crisis in the world’s financial markets, a significant 
rationing of funds in the sterling markets occurred and the mortgage 
securitization market virtually closed. Since Northern Rock’s business 
model is reliant on raising finance in the financial markets, the bank started 
to suffer from severe liquidity problems. On 14 September 2007, the Bank 
of England granted the so called emergency liquidity assistance to Northern 
Rock. However, after the grant decision was made public, the difficulties of 
Northern Rock were further aggravated by a “bank-run”. Then the Treasury 
announced guarantee arrangements for all existing accounts in Northern 
Rock. These assumed liability guarantee would be backed by State 
resources. Later, the guarantee was extended to cover new retail deposits. 
 
On December 5, 2007 the Commission adopted a decision on all the 
measures which the UK authorities took since 14 September. According to 
the Commission, the initial provision of emergency liquidity assistance by 
the Bank of England was provided against high quality collateral, bearing a 
premium interest rate and without a government indemnity.
171
 Also these 
measures were taken at the Bank of England’s own initiative independently 
from other measures. Therefore, the Commission concluded that liquidity 
assistance does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) 
EC. However, the Commission asserted that later measures, guarantees and 
further extensions, constitute State aid.  
 
The Commission analyzed two exemptions, Article 87(3)(b) and Article 
87(3)(c), in its assessment of compatibility. As regards compatibility under 
Article 87(3)(b), the Commission considered that “an aid benefitting one 
operator or one sector only could not address the kind of situation targeted 
by this clause”.
172
 Although the UK authorities argued that a systemic crisis 
might have arisen because of the reaction of the market and the behaviour of 
depositors, the Commission did not conclude in that way and considered the 
aid package for Northern Rock as designed to resolve the problems of a 
single recipient rather than remedy serious economic disruption.  
 
As regards the compatibility under Article 87(3)(c), the Commission 
referred to the R&R Guidelines. The Commission concluded that the aid 
measures for Northern Rock can be authorized as rescue aid in line with the 
R&R Guidelines. The Commission also applied an exception for banking 
sector laid down in the R&R Guidelines.
173
 Accordingly, rescue aids must 
be given in the form of loans and guarantees lasting no more than six 
months. However, an exception is made in the case of rescue aid in the 
banking sector, in order to enable the credit institution in question to 
continue temporarily carrying on its banking business in accordance with 
the prudential legislation in force. Finally, in line with the rules, the UK 
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authorities committed to present a restructuring plan for Northern Rock 
going beyond the short term rescue by 17 March 2008.
174
 
4.1.2 Sachsen LB 
Sachsen LB was the central institution for savings banks in Saxony, with a 
group balance sheet total of € 67.8 billion by the year 2006.
175
 As a 
commercial bank, Sachsen LB executed all kinds of banking transactions. 
However, in 2007 Sachsen LB ran into difficulties due to its investments in 
US subprime markets. Three major rating agencies downgraded a huge part 
of assets backed by mortgages which ranged from A+ to BB, to as low as 
CCC because of high default and foreclosure rates. During that period, 
hedge funds and institutional investors refused to reinvest in mortgage-
backed commercial papers. Therefore, in August 2007 Sachsen LB was 
unable to refinance itself any longer and needed liquidity of up to € 17.1 
billion in order to avoid fire sales.  
 
On 19 August 2007, a group of 10 German Landesbanken and DekaBank
176
 
granted Sachsen LB a liquidity facility through commitment of buying its 
commercial papers up to an amount of €17.1 billion if these could not be 
placed on the market. One week after signing of this contract, Sachsen LB 
was sold to LBBW. According to the sales agreement, Sachsen LB would 
be sold with effect from 1 January 2008 and the price would be determined 
by an evaluation of an independent expert by the end of 2007. At the time of 
the sale, the parties expected that the crisis would be over by the end of 
2007. However, towards end of 2007, further risks involved in Sachsen 
LB’s structured investment portfolio appeared.
177
 This has jeopardized the 
final sale of the bank because LBBW was neither capable nor willing to 
assume such huge losses.  
 
After intensive negotiations, a final agreement was concluded. Accordingly, 
the entire structured investments of Sachsen LB were divided into two 
portfolios. One portfolio with a nominal value of € 11.8 billion was sold 
with Sachsen LB to LBBW. The second portfolio with a nominal value of € 
17.5 billion remained in a special investment vehicle, the so-called “Super 
SIV”. To this end, the Free State of Saxony granted a guarantee to the 
amount of € 2.75 billion for losses from the Super SIV. LBBW had also 
produced a restructuring plan covering a period of four years until the end of 
2011.  
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The Commission questioned the liquidity support and sale of Sachsen LB 
and started the formal investigation procedure. The Commission 
acknowledges the fact that public authorities might need to react to threats 
to the stability of the financial markets. However, the Commission should 
ensure that such interventions do not distort trade in the markets. Otherwise, 
it would be very “hard for European citizens to understand why they have to 
suffer from the economic downturn, while taxpayers’ money is poured into 
once profitable banks that took excessive risks and might now avoid paying 
for their risky strategies”.
178
 
 
Germany claimed that these measures were adopted on the basis of market 
economy investor principle and therefore do not constitute State aid. As 
regards to the liquidity measure, the Commission firstly stated that the credit 
facility which had been made available by the banking pool to Sachsen LB 
is attributable to the State. Then, the Commission concluded that 
considering the conditions attached to the liquidity measure, a market 
economy investor would not have granted the credit to the Sachsen LB. 
Therefore, the measure constitutes aid. As regards the State guarantee in the 
context of the sale, its effect was to render the sales price negative for the 
Land of Saxony because the potential losses were higher than the proceeds 
of sale. The Commission mentioned that in such a case a private owner 
would have opted for liquidation of Sachsen LB rather than a sale. As a 
result guarantee measure also constituted State aid. Then the Commission 
analyzed the compatibility of these measures with the common market on 
the basis of Article 87(3)(b) and (c) EC.  
 
For the application of Article 87(3)(b), the Commission emphasized that the 
“aid cannot be benefitting only one company or one sector but must tackle a 
disturbance in the entire economy”.
179
 The Commission also relied on the 
fact that this provision of the EC Treaty has not been used for the cases of 
banks in difficulty until that time. According to the Commission, the 
problems of Sachsen LB are due to company-specific events and thus 
require tailor-made remedies. The Commission, therefore, found no ground 
for compatibility of these measures on the basis of Article 87(3)(b). 
 
The Commission then analyzed the compatibility of the measures under 
Article 87(3)(c) EC. The Commission considered the liquidity support as 
compatible rescue aid on the basis of R&R Guidelines because it meets all 
the necessary conditions such as being in the form of liquidity support and 
being limited to six months. The Commission considered the second 
measure as restructuring aid and assessed compatibility on that basis. Since 
the restructuring aid provided to Sachsen LB satisfies the conditions laid 
down in the R&R Guidelines such as restoration of long-term viability, 
limitation of aid to the minimum necessary, significant own contribution 
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and compensatory measures, the measure was deemed compatible with the 
State aid rules.   
 
4.2 Phase II – Acknowledgement of the 
Systemic Nature of the Crisis and 
Adoption of New Measures 
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the crisis intensified both in scope 
and scale and turned out to be a systemic one. At that point, even the 
fundamentally sound financial institutions in Europe faced refinancing 
difficulties. These developments forced the Commission reconsider its 
attitude towards the financial crisis. Finally, the Commission acknowledged 
the likelihood that the bank failures and liquidity shortage in the market 
could lead to a serious disturbance in the economy of Member States.
180
 The 
Commission recognized that the financial services sector has a pivotal role 
in providing financing to the rest of the economy. Consequently, “there is a 
systemic crisis that affects not only the entire functioning of the financial 
market but of the economy as a whole.”
181
 In this context, the Commission 
considers that, beyond emergency support for the financial system, the 
current global crisis requires exceptional policy responses.
182
 
 
As a result, the Commission started to refer “a rarely-used and more lenient 
provision” to authorize national recovery plans and individual rescue 
measures, namely Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty.
183
 However, there was no 
established practice to derive the necessary conditions for the compatibility 
of aid granted under that provision. Therefore, the Commission issued a 
guidance on how Member States might comply with Article 87(3)(b) while 
respecting the State aid rules on 13 October 2008, namely the Commission 
Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial 
crisis (hereinafter the Banking Communication).
184
 The Banking 
Communication covers measures to guarantee the liabilities of financial 
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institutions, recapitalizations, controlled winding up and other forms of 
liquidity assistance. On December 2008, the Commission released a second 
Communication on the recapitalization of financial institutions in the 
current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and 
safeguards against undue distortions of competition
185
 (hereinafter the 
Recapitalization Communication), which complements the Banking 
Communication. Since then, these two sets of guidelines have been used as 
the basis for the approval of every Member State financial sector rescue or 
general support scheme.
186
 The next chapters provide a detailed analysis of 
these two Communications.  
4.2.1 Banking Communication  
Banking Communication indicates how the Commission intends to apply 
State aid rules to State interventions in the form of either general schemes or 
individual assistance to credit institutions within the context of current 
crisis. The underlying principle of the Communication is the recognition by 
the Commission that Article 87(3)(b) EC is available as a legal basis for aid 
measures undertaken to address the current systemic crisis. Apparently, 
Article 87(3)(b) EC gives the Commission a new basis to authorize 
exceptional aid measures that goes well beyond its established practices and 
pre-existing guidelines such as the R&R Guidelines. However, the 
Commission emphasizes that this exemption cannot be applied without 
restrictions.  
 
The Commission intends to make an individual assessment of each case and 
confirm the risk of serious disturbances in each case. Furthermore, the 
Commission particularly favours the general schemes available to several or 
all financial institutions. However, the Commission considers it an essential 
element for the compatibility of any general scheme that the Member State 
carries out a review at least every six months and terminates as soon as the 
economic situation permits.
187
 The Banking Communication also makes a 
clear distinction between the treatment of financial institutions that due to 
the global financial crisis are illiquid but otherwise fundamentally sound 
and financial institutions characterized by endogenous problems such as 
inefficiencies, poor asset-liability management or risky strategies. 
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Distortions of competition resulting from schemes supporting the viability 
of the institutions in the first group will be more limited and require less 
substantial restructuring. On the other hand, institutions in the second group 
would fit with the normal framework of rescue aid and as a result need a far-
reaching restructuring and compensatory measures.
188
 Moreover, by 
reference to the general principles underlying the State aid rules, the 
Banking Communication requires that all aid measures must: (i) comply 
with the principle of non-discrimination; (ii) avoid or minimize distortions 
of competition as far as possible; and (iii) be limited to what is strictly 
necessary.  
 
4.2.1.1 Guarantees Covering the Liabilities of Financial 
Institutions 
As explored before, guarantees have been used extensively to support 
financial institutions in difficulty.
189
 However, the Commission Notice on 
Guarantees introduces strict conditions for the compatibility of these 
guarantees. It is very likely that guarantees developed during the financial 
crisis would not meet these conditions. The innovative and the flexible part 
of the Banking Communication is that the Commission may still authorize 
such guarantees on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC.  
 
According to the Banking Communication, the State guarantees might cover 
liabilities extending beyond retail deposits based on the condition that they 
are in line with the general principles of State aid law. The Commission also 
recognizes that the drying-up of interbank lending may justify guaranteeing 
certain types of wholesale deposits and even short- and medium-term debt 
instruments.
190
 However, such guarantees should not include hybrid or 
subordinated debt considered as Tier 2 capital because in such a case merely 
shareholders and investors would benefit from such guarantees.
191
 
 
The Commission emphasizes that the conditions of eligibility must be 
objective and non-discriminatory. Particularly, there should be no 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality. Therefore, all institutions 
incorporated in the Member State concerned, including subsidiaries and 
institutions having significant activities in that Member State should be 
covered by the guarantee scheme.
192
 
 
Regarding temporal scope of the guarantee schemes, the Commission 
asserts that the schemes extending beyond retail deposit guarantees must be 
limited to the minimum necessary. Member States should also carry out a 
review every six months to establish the justification for the continued 
application of the scheme.
193
 The approval of the scheme may cover a 
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period longer than six months and up to two years as long as the financial 
crisis requires so. Therefore, the Banking Communication adopts a more 
flexible approach as regards duration of guarantees. The Commission states 
that guarantee schemes during the financial crisis may be granted for a 
period of two years as opposed to six months limit under the R&R 
Guidelines.
194
  
 
In order to ensure that the aid is kept to a minimum, the Commission 
reaffirms the principle of private sector contribution. Accordingly, Member 
States must take appropriate steps to ensure a significant contribution from 
the beneficiaries and/or the sector to the cost of the guarantee.
195
 
 
The scheme should also contain certain behavioural constraints to minimize 
distortions of competition and avoid moral hazard problem. These 
behavioural constraints may vary from restrictions on commercial conduct, 
and the limitations to the size of the balance sheet of the beneficiaries to the 
prohibition of the share repurchases and issuance of new stock options.
196
  
 
Finally, where the guarantee scheme has been invoked for the benefit of 
individual credit institutions, it has to be followed up by adequate steps 
leading to restructuring or liquidation of the beneficiary. That is to say, after 
the payment has been done within six months, a restructuring or liquidation 
plan should be submitted for the Commission’s assessment.   
 
4.2.1.2 Recapitalization of Financial Institutions 
The Banking Communication provides further guidance for the 
establishment of recapitalization schemes as a second measure which could 
be taken in response to the financial crisis. Member States may use these 
schemes to support financial institutions that are fundamentally sound but 
experienced distress due to the extreme conditions in financial markets.  
 
The main novelty of the Communication is that recapitalization schemes 
could be launched as emergency measure now. Under the R&R Guidelines, 
these capital interventions were allowed only after a restructuring plan was 
submitted and assessed by the Commission. Rescue aid measures were the 
only emergency measure and limited to six months but now Member States 
could use recapitalization schemes as emergency measures.
197
   
 
The conditions introduced above in relation to guarantee schemes apply, 
mutadis mutandis, also to recapitalization schemes. This covers objectivity 
and non-discrimination criteria for eligibility, duration up to two years, 
keeping aid to minimum necessary, behavioral constraints, requirement for a 
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restructuring plan to be presented and assessed by the Commission. 
Moreover, Member States should receive rights whose value corresponds to 
their contribution to the recapitalization. Market-oriented valuation must be 
used while determining the issue price of new shares. In that regard, the 
Commission considers preferred shares with adequate remuneration and 
claw-back mechanisms positively.
198
 
 
4.2.1.3 Controlled Winding-up and Other Forms of 
Liquidity Assistance 
Controlled winding-up is usually seen as forming part of a general guarantee 
scheme or as being taken in relation to individual institutions. For individual 
institutions, controlled winding-up could be either a second step after a 
failing rescue aid to allow for restructuring or could be done immediately 
when the need was identified.
199
 In this context, the Banking 
Communication provides that the assessment of such a scheme or individual 
liquidation measures should follow the same rules as in the case of 
guarantee schemes.
200
 Moreover, the liquidation phase should be limited to 
the period strictly necessary for the orderly winding-up. During this period, 
the beneficiary undertaking should not pursue any new activities and its 
banking license should be withdrawn as soon as possible. In order to avoid 
the possibility of granting aid to the buyers of the credit institution, the 
Banking Communication lays down a number of criteria to be followed by 
the Commission. Accordingly:
201
 
 the sales process should be open and non-discriminatory; 
 the sale should take place on market terms; 
 the sales price for the assets and liabilities should be maximized; and 
 any aid granted to the economic activity to be sold should be 
examined under R&R Guidelines.
202
 
 
In addition to recapitalization and guarantee schemes, Member States might 
also wish to provide liquidity support to the credit institutions. These 
supports generally include funds from central bank. The Commission 
clarifies that the general, non-selective measures open to all comparable 
market players in the market (e.g. lending to the whole market on equal 
terms) are outside the scope of State aid rules.
203
 Dedicated support to a 
specific financial institution may still be considered outside the scope of 
State aid rules based on the condition that the following non-exhaustive 
criteria are met:
204
 
 the financial institution is solvent at the moment of the liquidity 
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provision; 
 the facility is fully secured by collateral to which “haircuts” 
(margins) are applied; 
 the central bank charges a penal interest rate on the beneficiary; and 
 the measure is taken at the central bank’s own initiative. 
 
Any liquidity support failing to satisfy these criteria may still be considered 
as compatible, provided that it fulfills the conditions under the R&R 
Guidelines. Again, the approval of the liquidity scheme may cover a period 
up to two years with the possibility of further extension.  
 
Finally, the Banking Communication puts in place a fast track procedure for 
State aids which comply with the rules set out. The Commission, motivated 
with the legal certainty concerns and avoidance of undue distortions, aims to 
take a decision on notified measures within 24 hours. 
 
4.2.2  Recapitalization Communication  
Since the nature, scope and conditions of recapitalization schemes may vary 
significantly, both the Member States and potential beneficiaries have asked 
for more guidance on the compatibility of specific forms of recapitalization. 
It was also very difficult to calculate a proper remuneration rate for these 
varying types of schemes. Member States also started to pursue diverse 
objectives in their grant of recapitalization schemes. For instance, they 
started to aim not primarily to avoid insolvency of individual credit 
institutions but rather to facilitate the recovery of inter-bank lending and to 
ensure lending to the real economy.
205
 The Commission then adopted a 
Recapitalization Communication to provide guidance for new types of 
recapitalization schemes.  
 
In the Communication, the Commission refers to the three possible 
competition concerns; competition between Member States, competition 
between banks and return to normal market functioning. Therefore, any 
proposed recapitalization scheme should take into consideration these 
concerns. Ideally proposed schemes should strike a balance between 
competitive effects at three levels and the different objectives of the scheme 
pursued. In that respect, a proper remuneration rate, combined with 
appropriate behavioral safeguards, is a critical tool to arbitrate among these 
various objectives and concerns.
206
 The Recapitalization Communication 
states two factors to consider while calculating the remuneration rate of 
capital injections: (i) closeness of pricing to market prices, and (ii) 
incentives for the bank to redeem the State as soon as the crisis is over.
207
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The Communication also makes a more clear-cut distinction between banks 
in difficulties (distressed and less-performing banks) on the one hand and 
banks that are fundamentally sound and well-performing on the other. The 
Commission follows two different methods for the calculation of 
remuneration and assessment of commitments for each of these categories. 
The details of those calculations are outside scope of this paper but it is safe 
to say that the Commission imposes much stricter requirements for the 
recapitalization of credit institutions that are not fundamentally sound. The 
extent of commitments sought by the Commission in the case of 
fundamentally sound credit institutions is clearly more limited than for 
distressed banks. For instance, the Commission asks for less strict 
safeguards to avoid undue competition distortions for fundamentally sound 
institutions because it assumes that the distortion of competition will be 
limited in such a case. The Commission also considers this distinction in 
remuneration rate calculations and enforces a lower remuneration rate for 
the well-performing credit institutions.  
 
The cases below provide an analysis of the Commission’s approach during 
Phase II where the Commission started to recognize the systemic effects of 
the crisis and started to refer Article 87(3)(b) EC for compatibility. The 
Commission even recognized that in some cases difficulties encountered by 
a single credit institution might create a serious disturbance in the economy 
of a Member State. A detailed list of aid measures authorized by the 
Commission pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC during the financial crisis can 
be found in Appendix.  
4.2.3 Guarantee Scheme for Banks in Ireland 
As a reaction to the impact of recent international market turmoil on Irish 
Banking system, the Irish scheme introduced a guarantee arrangement to 
safeguard all deposits (retail, commercial, institutional and interbank), 
covered bonds, senior unsecured debt and dated subordinated debt (lower 
tier II) with certain banks.
208
 The six banks covered by the scheme were 
Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, Irish Life and 
Permanent, Irish Nationwide Building Society and the Educational Building 
Society and such specific subsidiaries. Later, the Irish government 
confirmed that the scheme would also be applicable to certain foreign 
banks’ subsidiaries in Ireland “with a significant and broad based footprint 
in the domestic economy”.
209
 In particular, Ulster Bank, First Active, 
Halifax Bank of Scotland, IIB Bank and Postbank would be eligible for the 
scheme.  
 
The Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Act 2008, which came into force 
on 2 October 2008, provides a legislative framework to underpin the 
guarantee arrangement for depositors and lenders to Irish financial 
institutions. According to the Act, financial support can be provided to the 
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credit institutions in order to maintain the stability of the financial system in 
Ireland. However, the financial support cannot be granted for a period 
longer than two years.  
 
Institutions covered by the scheme should pay a quarterly charge which will 
be calculated by reference to the aggregate cost to the State, the institution’s 
risk profile and the composition of the institution’s covered liabilities. The 
institutions should also indemnify the Irish government in respect of any 
payments made under the guarantee or any other costs incurred in that 
regard. The scheme also introduced a claw-back clause. Accordingly, where 
the guarantee is activated and a payment is made but the payments cannot 
be recouped in full from the credit institution concerned, it would be 
recouped in full from the covered institutions over time, “in a manner 
consistent with their long-term viability and sustainability”.
210
 
 
The scheme also provides the power to direct the commercial conduct and 
competitive behaviour of covered credit institutions to minimize any 
potential competitive distortion. In particular, the rate of expansion of their 
activities must not exceed certain limits. These credit institutions must 
comply with all directions given and requirements made by the Minister of 
Finance or Irish Regulatory Authority. They must conduct their affairs in a 
manner that progressively reduces the risk undertaken by the guarantee. 
Appropriate balance sheet management, application of improved structures 
to ensure long-term stability of funding, restructuring executive 
management responsibilities, and improving liquidity, solvency and capital 
ratios are examples of such measures which have to be taken by the covered 
institutions. Finally, in the event of a default of a covered institution, it will 
have to draw up a restructuring plan within six months and comply with the 
directions.  
 
In its assessment, the Commission firstly mentioned that the commercial 
terms of the guarantee are not in accordance with the market economy 
investor principle. Therefore, the guarantee confers selective advantage to 
the banks concerned and should be regarded as State aid within the meaning 
of Article 87(1) EC. Regarding the compatibility of the measure, the 
Commission applied Article 87(3)(b) EC because even the fundamentally 
sound banks were having troubles getting access to liquidity and the 
guarantee scheme is designed to overcome this difficulty. The Commission 
also took into account the fact that difficulties of the banking sector might 
have a systemic effect for other industry sectors and the entire Irish 
economy due to its pivot role in providing funds to other sectors. Hence, the 
scheme tends to remedy a serious disturbance in the Irish economy.  
 
For further analysis, the Commission refers to the Banking Communication 
and three specific conditions laid down there: appropriateness, necessity and 
proportionality. First, as regards appropriateness, the Commission found 
that the guarantee scheme is an appropriate measure to restore confidence in 
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the financial markets and overcome a market failure for wholesale funding 
that affects even healthy credit institutions.
211
 Secondly, the Commission 
examined whether the guarantee was limited to the minimum necessary in 
scope and time to reach the objective. Regarding the scope of the guarantee, 
the Commission considered the “drying-up of interbank lending due to an 
erosion of confidence between financial institutions” in the context of the 
current wide spread crisis and held that inclusions of retail deposits, 
wholesale deposits and subordinated debts were necessary.
212
 Specific 
restrictions adopted by the Irish government to avoid undue competition 
distortions within the context of subordinated debt were found sufficient. 
Regarding the time, the Commission acknowledged that two-year period 
was the minimum necessary for such a scheme to safeguard financial 
stability. Finally, as regards proportionality, the distortions of competition 
were properly balanced via various safeguards against the positive effects of 
the scheme. The Commission considered that the beneficiaries would 
contribute, as much as possible, to the costs of the scheme and as a result 
any distortions would be limited to the minimum. The Commission also 
referred to the appropriate behavioural safeguards against abuse of the 
scheme, including restrictions on commercial conduct and restrictions on 
balance-sheet growth.
213
 Consequently, the Commission found the Irish 
support scheme for financial institutions compatible with the EC Treaty and 
approved it. 
 
4.2.4 Aid to ING Groep N.V. 
ING Groep N.V. is a global financial institution based in Netherlands.
214
 
ING operates in more than 50 countries in all around the world and provides 
diversified financial services such as banking, investments, insurance and 
retirement services. During the crisis, the adequacy level of capital for 
financial institutions raised significantly mainly due to a sudden and 
dramatic increase in the market’s view of the risks contained in the banks’ 
balance sheets. Although ING is a fundamentally sound credit institution, it 
needed to reinforce its core tier 1 capital
215
 position in order to reassure the 
financial markets of its stability. Therefore, the Dutch authorities made an 
emergency intervention to recapitalize ING with € 10 billion via a special 
type of securities which were issued on 12 November 2008. After the capital 
injection, core tier 1 capital position of ING would increase from 6.5% to 
8%.  
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These perpetual securities will produce an annual coupon equal to the higher 
of:
216
 
 € 0.85 per security, non-cumulative, payable annually in arrears; 
 110% of the dividend paid on the ordinary shares in 2009; 
 120% of the dividend paid on the ordinary shares in 2010; 
 125% of the dividend paid on the ordinary shares from 2011 
onwards. 
 
The coupon is to be paid only if a dividend is paid on the ordinary shares. In 
the event that ING decides to repurchase the securities, the Dutch State will 
receive 150% of the issue price. The Dutch State will also have some rights 
in the corporate governance such as the right to nominate two members for 
ING’s supervisory board at the group’s next annual general meeting. 
Furthermore, ING’s supervisory board will develop a sustainable 
remuneration policy for the group’s executive board and senior 
management. 
 
In its analysis, the Commission first assessed whether the measure 
constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. The Commission 
concluded that ING could not have raised such financing in such time frame 
at comparable conditions without the State intervention, and thus the 
recapitalization constituted State aid.
217
 However, in line with the conditions 
in Banking Communication, the measure could be held compatible with the 
common market on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC. In that regard, as in 
Irish guarantee scheme, the Commission set out three main conditions to be 
fulfilled: appropriateness, necessity and proportionality. Since the Banking 
Communication states that these conditions should apply equally for 
recapitalization schemes and also for individual cases, the Commission then 
assessed the compatibility of the measure with these criteria.  
 
Regarding necessity condition, the Commission recognized that ING has a 
pivotal function within the Dutch financial sector. Thus, “a loss of 
confidence in such a core institution would have led to a further disturbance 
of the current financial situation and harmful spill-over effects to the 
economy as a whole”.
218
 As a result, a public sector intervention in ING is 
considered to be an appropriate mean to strengthen and restore market 
confidence in the Dutch financial sector. The Commission made a 
distinction between fundamentally sound institutions, as in this case, and 
institutions that are additionally suffering from more structural solvency 
problems. As mentioned before, the Commission is said to impose more 
lenient conditions in the former case.  
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Moreover, the measure was limited in time because the Dutch authorities 
and ING have committed to submit a restructuring plan within six months.  
 
The Commission has also verified that ING would be making an appropriate 
own contribution even with the uncertainty inherent in such core tier 1 
securities. The expected return on securities was in excess of 10%, taking 
into account the annual coupon and repurchase premium. According to the 
Commission, this rate would be an adequate remuneration to the State.  
 
In order to avoid undue distortions of competition and prevent abuse of the 
State support, the measure introduced sufficient behavioral safeguards 
including balance sheet growth constraints, the maintenance of a certain 
solvency ratio and the limitation of expansion of ING’s business activities 
that it would have not pursued if it had not received the capital injection. In 
the case of any deviations, the Commission would be informed and could 
impose additional behavioral constraints if necessary.  
 
Since the above mentioned criteria are fulfilled, the Commission considered 
the measure compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 
87(3)(b) EC and authorized it as emergency intervention in the face of the 
current financial crisis for a period of 6 months.  
 
 
 57 
5 Conclusion 
Financial services play a critical role in supporting economic growth and 
development. These services help private citizens save money, guard against 
uncertainty, and build credit. On a more macro level, financial services oil 
the wheels of other industrial sectors by encouraging investment and 
improving the quality of that investment. As a result, businesses are able to 
start up, expand, increase efficiency, and compete in local and international 
markets. These qualities, which are highly important for the development 
and competitiveness of a nation, render the financial services sector a 
specific one. Due to the specific nature of this sector, a serious downturn 
encountered in this sector might result in a systemic crisis and have 
disastrous effects on the real economy. 
 
In the EU, the competitiveness in this specific sector increased significantly 
with the adoption of banking Directives. Credit institutions were trying to 
survive in a broader market while ensuring the full compliance to strict EU 
banking rules. The need for public financing was the inevitable consequence 
for many credit institutions. On the other hand, Member State governments 
motivated with the importance of this sector were intervening this sector via 
public instruments, notably State aid measures.  
 
However, the peculiarities of the financial services sector and the possible 
risk of systemic crisis resulting from the financial difficulty of large credit 
institutions did not justify the adoption of a specific guideline to govern the 
application of State aid rules in this sector. Neither the EC Treaty nor the 
banking Directives contains any specific provisions or exemptions for the 
financial services sector. Therefore, any aid to credit institutions should be 
examined under the Treaty rules on State aid. Article 87(1) EC lists five 
criteria to be fulfilled to consider a State aid measure incompatible with the 
common market.  
 
Exceptions to this general rule can be found in Article 87(2) and (3) EC. In 
the financial services sector, the two provisions laid down under Article 
87(3) EC are generally considered to be highly relevant for potential 
justifications of aid measures to credit institutions: Article 87(3)(b); “aid to 
remedy a serious disturbance” and Article 87(3)(c); “aid to facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas”. 
Until the recent financial crisis, the Commission was firm on not applying 
Article 87(3)(b) EC derogation for financial services sector. The 
Commission was trying to ensure a level playing field in financial services 
and promote competition. Therefore, in spite of the pressures from Member 
States, the Commission refused to apply this derogation. The Commission 
asserted that the failure of one or more credit institutions does not 
necessarily lead to a systemic crisis. In some cases, the Commission argued 
that the difficulties of the credit institutions were company-specific and aid 
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measures concerned were not designed to remedy a serious disturbance in 
the economy but only to remedy the difficulties of a single undertaking.  
 
On the other hand, Article 87(3)(c) EC is more often relied as a possible 
justification of the State aid granted in financial services sector. On that 
basis, the Commission adopted 2004 R&R Guidelines and 2008 
Commission Notice to provide guidance on rescue and restructuring aid and 
State guarantees. These legislative acts are most commonly applied by the 
Commission in financial services sector while assessing the compatibility of 
aid measures with the Treaty. However, the Commission sets forth rather 
strict conditions to be fulfilled in these acts.
219
 
 
The recent financial crisis raised the question of application of State aid 
rules in the financial services sector once more. Up until the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the Commission did not realize how big the impact of 
crisis could be. During this time period, the Commission examined case-by-
case rescue measures aimed to address liquidity difficulties of credit 
institutions on the basis of established practices e.g. by referring to the R&R 
Guidelines. Despite the exceptional nature of the situation, the Commission 
stated that the existing legal framework is flexible enough to accommodate 
exceptional and country-specific circumstances.
220
 The Commission 
constantly refused to authorize rescue measures pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) 
EC. According to the Commission, the problems encountered in the 
financial services sector were individual problems of the institutions and 
thus, any measure adopted to solve the problems of these institutions cannot 
be considered as a remedy to a serious disturbance in the economy. 
 
It took almost one year for the Commission to acknowledge that the 
financial crisis might lead to systemic effects when the financial crisis 
actually spilled into the real economy. The Commission finally recognized 
the pivotal role of financial services sector and accepted that exceptional 
policy responses, far beyond emergency support, should be adopted to 
tackle the current global crisis. The Commission then started to apply 
Article 87(3)(b) EC derogation for general remedial schemes of the Member 
States. It even recognized that in some cases difficulties of a single credit 
institution might create serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State. This shows a huge difference in the Commission’s attitude.  
 
In order to promote legal certainty, the Commission adopted a detailed 
guidelines on the application of Article 87(3)(b) EC to the current global 
crisis. The so-called Banking Communication focuses on guarantee 
schemes, recapitalization schemes, controlled winding-up and other forms 
of liquidity assistance. Just a few months later, the Commission adopted a 
second guidelines (the Recapitalization Communication) to lay down 
detailed rules for recapitalization schemes.  
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 See Chapter 3 for details of these rules. 
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 Gerard Damien, (2009). 
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Compared to the R&R Guidelines, the Banking Communication has a 
broader scope and brings some flexibility. As regards the scope, the 
Commission acknowledged that Member States might adopt general 
measures to remedy the problems of the whole financial services sector. In 
the R&R Guidelines, Member States should limit themselves to individual 
rescue and restructuring aid for certain institutions.
221
 Regarding the 
flexibility, obviously the Member States have now another derogation 
ground, Article 87(3)(b) EC in addition to Article 87(3)(c) EC. Apart from 
that, the Commission adopted a more flexible approach for the duration of 
certain rescue measures including guarantee schemes. The Commission 
accepted to authorize these measures for up to two years as long as the 
financial crisis requires so. The time limit was six months under the R&R 
Guidelines. Finally, the Banking Communication puts in place a fast track 
procedure for State aids which comply with the conditions set forth. The 
Commission aims to take a decision on notified measures within 24 hours or 
over a weekend. In the R&R Guidelines, a simplified procedure was also 
introduced and the Commission was prepared to adopt a decision within a 
month. However, considering the limitations attached to this procedure
222
, it 
is very hard to conclude that it would be beneficial for the large companies 
in difficulty.  
 
Apart from these novelties, the Guidelines adopted during the financial 
crisis can be defined as the consolidation of the EU general principles or the 
Commission’s existing practices. An overview of the conditions laid down 
in these guidelines show that the Commission stick to the EU general 
principles such as non-discrimination and proportionality; to the conditions 
already mentioned in the R&R Guideline and 2008 Commission Notice on 
guarantees such as submission of restructuring plan, contribution from the 
beneficiaries and restoration of long-term viability. Moreover, while 
assessing the own contribution or appropriate remuneration rate, the 
Commission refers to a well-established test, the so-called market economy 
investor test. 
 
Therefore, the Commission brings nothing new except for some small 
flexibility measures. These measures were enough to include the 
Commission into the management of current financial crisis. However, the 
sufficiency of them is highly doubtful. Enforcement of EC State aid rules 
during the crisis has been largely consistent with the established principles 
because according to the Commissioner Kroes these measures are 
“sophisticated enough to cope with the differences and strong enough to 
cope with the difficulties”.
223
 Obviously, it will take a while to conclude 
whether she is right or wrong. 
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guidance on state aid to banks”, Legal Week, State Aid Bailouts. 
222 Aid measure should be notified, the amount should be based on past operating cash 
flows and should not exceed € 10 million. 
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 Kroes Neelie, (8 December 2008). 
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Appendix   
Aid Measures Authorized Pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC 
During the Financial Crisis
224
 
Member 
State 
Case 
"umber 
Decision 
Date 
Title Aid Instrument 
Austria N557/2008 09.12.2008 Austrian Scheme Direct grant, 
guarantee, other 
forms of equity 
intervention  
Belgium NN42/2008 03.12.2008 BE – Fortis Provision of risk 
capital 
Belgium NN49/2008 13.03.2009 Dexia – (BE/LU/FR) Guarantee, other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
Belgium N574/2008 19.11.2008 Garantie Fortis – BE Guarantee 
Belgium N602/2008 18.12.2008 KBC Provision of risk 
capital 
Denmark NN51/2008 10.10.2008 Liquidity support scheme 
for banks in Denmark 
Guarantee 
Denmark N31a/2009 03.02.2009 Recapitalization of 
financial institutions and 
amendment of the 
Guarantee Scheme 
Guarantees, other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
Denmark NN39/2008 05.11.2008 Aid for liquidation of 
Roskilde Bank 
Winding-up 
Finland N567/2008 13.11.2008 Finnish Guarantee 
Scheme for banks’ 
funding 
Guarantee 
France NN50/2008 13.03.2009 Dexia – FR (transferred 
to C9/09) 
Guarantee, other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
France N548/2008 20.11.2008 Financial support 
measures to the banking 
industry in France 
Guarantee, other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
Germany N512/2008 27.10.2008 German banks rescue 
scheme 
Financing of the aid 
(accumulated 
services, public 
enterprises, and 
other), guarantee, 
other forms of 
equity intervention 
Germany N17/2009 21.01.2009 State aid to German 
deposit guarantee scheme 
for private banks 
Guarantee 
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 Cases are adopted from the European Commission website, State Aid Register. 
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Germany N655/2008 22.12.2008 NORD-LB – Besichertes 
Garantiertes Medium 
Term- Preogramm 
Financing of the aid 
(public enterprises 
and other), 
guarantee 
Germany N639/2008 22.12.2008 Gewährung einer 
SoFFin-Garantie an die 
IKB. Die Maßnahme 
wird im Rahmen einer 
Beihilferegelung 
(FMStG) gewährt. Die 
Anmeldung erfolgt daher 
vorsorglich. 
Guarantee 
Germany N615/2008 18.12.2008 Bayern-LB Guarantee, 
provision of risk 
capital 
Greece N560/2008 19.11.2008 Greek financial support 
measure 
Guarantee, 
provision of risk 
capital 
Ireland NN48/2008 13.10.2008 Guarantee scheme for 
banks in Ireland 
Guarantee 
Ireland N61/2009 16.02.2009 The taking of Anglo Irish 
Bank Corporation plc 
into public ownership 
 
Italy N520a/2008 09.12.2008 Piano di sostegno per le 
banche (d.l. 157/08) 
Guarantee 
Italy N648/2008 23.12.2008 Urgent measures to 
support the financing of 
the real economy in Italy 
Financing of aid 
(public enterprises 
and other), other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
Latvia NN68/2008 24.11.2008 Public support measures 
to JSC Parex Banka 
Guarantee, soft 
loan, other forms of 
equity intervention 
Latvia NN3/2009 11.02.2009 Amendments to the 
Public support measures 
to JSC Parex Banka 
Guarantee, soft 
loan, other forms of 
equity intervention 
Latvia N638/2008 22.12.2008 Procedure for issuing and 
supervision of guarantees 
for bank loan and take-
over of banks 
Guarantee 
Luxembourg NN45/2008 13.03.2009 Dexia – LUX (case 
transferred to C9/09) 
Provision of risk 
capital 
Luxembourg NN46/2008 03.12.2008 Fortis banque 
Luxembourg S.A. 
Soft loan 
Netherlands NN53a/2008 03.12.2008 Restructuring aid to 
Fortis Bank S.A./N.V. 
Soft loan 
Netherlands N524/2008 30.10.2008 Dutch credit guarantee 
scheme 
Financing of the aid 
(accumulated 
reserves and other), 
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guarantee 
Netherlands N569/2008 27.11.2008 Investment in the capital 
of AEGON N.V. 
Soft loan 
Netherlands N611/2008 10.12.2008 Investment in the capital 
of SNS REAAL N.V. 
Financing of the aid 
(public enterprises 
and other), other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
Netherlands N528/2008 01.12.2008 Participatie in het 
kernkapitaal van ING 
Financing of the aid 
(public enterprises 
and other), other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
Portugal NN60/2008 17.12.2008 Portugal - Concessão 
extraordinária de 
garantias pessoais pelo 
estado, para o reforço da 
estabilidade financeira e 
da disponibilização de 
liquidez nos mercados 
financeiros 
Financing of the aid 
(public enterprises 
and other), 
guarantee 
Portugal NN71/2008 13.03.2009 Concessão de garantia 
pessoal da república 
portuguesa a uma 
operação de 
financiamento, sob a 
forma de empréstimo 
bancário, concedida ao 
Banco privado português, 
S.A. 
Guarantee 
Slovenia N531/2008 12.12.2008 Slovénie - Public support 
measures to the financial 
sector 
Guarantee 
Slovenia N637/2008 20.03.2009 Liquidity scheme to the 
financial sector 
Soft loan 
Spain NN54a/2008 23.04.2009 Fund for the acquisition 
of financial assets in 
Spain 
Other forms of 
equity transfer 
Spain NN54b/2008 23.04.2009 Spanish guarantee 
scheme 
Guarantee 
Sweden N533/2008 29.10.2008 Sweden – Bank 
guarantee scheme 
Guarantee 
Sweden NN64/2008 15.12.2008 Public support measures 
to Carnegie 
Soft loan 
United 
Kingdom 
N507/2008 13.10.2008 Financial support 
measures to the banking 
industry in the UK 
Guarantee, other 
forms of equity 
intervention 
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